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ABSTRACT

THE CHALLENGES OF LEADERSHIP DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED STATES ARMY: THE OFFICER SCHOOLHOUSE (CAPTAINS CAREER COURSE, CAS³, CGSOC) by LTC Frank L. Barth, USA, 61 pages.

As the United States Army enters the 21st Century, it is focused on transformation of the force to meet the challenges of the future. The Army is spending large amounts of resources to organize and equip the Initial Brigade Combat Teams (IBCT) at Ft. Lewis, Washington along with it's continued digitization of the III Corps at Ft. Hood, Texas. The Army states it is focused on "comprehensive transformation". So far, the Army's focus has been on organizational and equipment transformation. Additionally, the Army is faced with serious morale concerns and challenges within the force. How do we meet these challenges and develop the officers who will lead the Army?

This monograph asks should the Army change its' officer leadership development process in its institutional training and education system from the Captains Career Course (C³), Combined Arms and Services Staff School (CAS³) to the Command and General Staff Officer Course (CGSOC)? What changes in the institutional schoolhouse would improve officer morale which would then increase officer retention and operational effectiveness throughout the Army?

This monograph concludes that improvement in leadership development needs to be embedded and holistic throughout the Army. Improvement needs to occur from the Army staff to the institutional schoolhouse. This includes improving the leadership curriculum currently being taught in the officer schoolhouse. Additionally, improving the quantity and quality of instructors who are the center of gravity to educational success in officer education. Finally, success in leadership development can only succeed with the full support of the senior Army leadership.

i

The Challenges of Leadership Development in the United States Army: The Officer Schoolhouse

A Monograph

by

Lieutenant Colonel Frank L. Barth

United States Army

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
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
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
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Table of Contents

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Students attending the Command & General Staff Officer Course (CGSOC) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, made these comments in March 2000, prior to an Army Chief of Staff visit.

> Senior leaders will throw subordinates under the bus in a heartbeat to protect or advance their career.... Counseling is not happening .... The most important thing is to be a leader yet the first thing that falls out when time is tight is mentoring and professional development programs ..... Mentoring is a catch-phrase ... Raters and Senior Raters are terrified of counseling. I've been in the Army 14 years, and I've been counseled in writing twice......No room for 'late bloomers;' no ability to overcome a 2 block....Forget about taking risk; we don't reward risk takers....."We have a checklist type of leadership...not true leadership...senior leaders are simply checking the block.[1]

These selected future leaders of the United States Army are only one group in the Army showing a decrease in morale. Why are these and other officers not satisfied with the leadership and leadership development they have seen after ten to fourteen years of military service? Other statistics support the idea that their a morale problem exists throughout the Army. Problems with morale translate into problems with retention and operational effectiveness and the Army's ability to effectively do its job. According to The Government Accounting Office (GAO) survey encompassing five installations, 43 percent of the Army officers surveyed were dissatisfied with military life and 53 percent were planning on leaving the Army following their service obligation.[2] Additionally, an increased number of Captains are leaving the service. A survey conducted by the Army Research Institute in May 1999 of company grade officers showed the percentage of those officers stating they would leave the Army prior to retirement had gone up from 30 percent in 1990 to 44 percent in 1998.[3] These alarming statistics demonstrate that morale and retention are serious problems in the United States Army.

Since the conclusion of Desert Storm in February of 1991, the United States Army has gone through dramatic changes in organization, personnel and missions. The current "buzzword" in

the Army is transformation. The Army is focused on unit/equipment transformation of selected units into the interim brigade sized units and the ongoing digitization of III Corps. Studies are being conducted into what the Division of the future will look like. The focus of transformation has been centered on equipment and organizational issues with little attention to developing leaders. A great amount of time and money is being spent on developing the "Objective Force" of the future. The Army's vision statement published in October 1999 stresses "comprehensive transformation of the Army" to meet the challenges of the future. A vital aspect of the Army's change would appear to be developing leaders.

> We are about leadership; it is our stock in trade, and it is what makes us different. We take soldiers who enter the force and grow them into leaders for the next generation of soldiers. We will continue to develop those leaders through study in the *institutional schoolhouse*, through *field experiences* gained in *operational assignments*, and through *personal study* and *professional readings*.[4]

Some changes have occurred in officer leadership development, primarily in officer management and assessment with the advent of OPMS XXI in 1997. New officer leadership development programs were introduced in October 1997 such as the new Officer Evaluation Report (OER) and the Junior Officer Developmental Support Form (JODSF). The introduction of the Army's capstone leadership document Field Manual 22-100, Army Leadership, in the summer of 1999, was an attempt to better develop officers.[5] However these attempts to improve officer leadership development in recent years has not been successful. Survey information from over 18,000 company and field grade officers in 2000 showed a significant decline in morale over the last two years or since the Army implemented some of the recent leadership programs.[6] Additionally, this survey showed a significant decline in leaders demonstrating Army values to their subordinate company and field grade officers.[7]

To understand leadership development it is important to understand the current Army system. The Army leadership development system is based upon the three pillars of interconnected, progressive and sequential institutional training & education, operational assignments and self-

development.[8] Institutional training and education, known as the institutional schoolhouse, is to provide officers with the knowledge and skills to prepare them for their next duty assignment. Knowledge is acquired and demonstrated in the institutional schoolhouse through role playing, practical exercises and simulations. Operational assignments place officers in positions that allow them to execute the knowledge and skills acquired from the institutional schoolhouse. Self-development is ongoing in the schoolhouse and operational assignments. Self-development can be greatly enhanced with focused assistance either from the schoolhouse or operational assignments.

The indicators of poor morale are shown by recent surveys and by officers' leaving the service in record numbers. Therefore, the key question this paper will address is should the Army change it's officer leadership development process in its institutional training and education system from the Captains Career Course (C^3), Combined Arms and Services Staff School (CAS^3) to the Command and General Staff Officer Course (CGSOC)? What changes in the institutional schoolhouse would improve officer morale which would then increase officer retention and operational effectiveness throughout the Army?

It is possible that the most significant change the United States Army can make to the institutional schoolhouse is improvement in individual officer leadership development. This improvement will include character development and leadership development, within the organizational structure/manning (Department of the Army to the schoolhouses). Officers must have improved assessment and feedback on their individual leadership qualities in order to improve their ability to lead but also to help better develop their subordinates' leadership abilities. What could be more important to a leader than to improve upon his own leadership as well as influencing his subordinates' leadership?

It is the intent of this paper to focus on leadership development that occurs in the institutional schoolhouse for officers from three-four years of service (Captains Career Course and the

3

Combined Arms and Services Staff School) and the ten-fourteen years of service (CGSOC or equivalent).[9] The institutional education officers attend during these years have enormous impact on the remainder of their service in the Army. These officers have been in the Army long enough to understand how it runs and to experience one to two significant operational assignments. The schoolhouse should build upon the students' past leadership experiences as it prepares them for their future assignments. The majority of officers departing the Captains Career Course and CAS[3] will command companies within the next year or two. These officers could go on and serve another fifteen to twenty-five years in the Army. Majors departing CGSOC will move on to key staff positions from battalion level and higher. Additionally, CGSOC is currently the last significant military education experience for most of these officers and is the last one prior to battalion command. These CGSOC student officers will continue to serve the Army for another six to sixteen years.

The institutional schoolhouse can be an effective agent of change in improving morale and helping inspire officers to stay in the service after their initial service obligation. The institutional schoolhouse can have more of a significant impact if utilized to its potential. The essential issue is officer morale. Improved morale would improve retention and organizational effectiveness. The past few years have shown an increase of discontent among officers. The number one issue affecting officers is increased operational tempo. Between 1988 to 1998, the percent of military personnel away from home due to deployments or training increased by 60 percent, with a 34 percent decrease in active duty military personnel strength in addition to a 34 percent decrease in real defense spending.[10] Officers and families are stressed by long separations, working long hours and trying to do more with less.

The second biggest reason after high operational tempo for company grade officers to leave the Army is due to the poor quality of the Army's leadership.[11] A common problem identified by officers is that they believe they are not receiving enough time being effectively counseled,

4

coached and mentored. When asked to rate leadership behaviors of their raters, a recent survey involving over 18,000 officers (company & field grade officers) identified quarterly counseling as a severe weakness. This was followed closely with rater's weakness in "offering constructive criticism to improve performance."[12] Additional issues of poor leadership are the weakness in Army values and character being demonstrated by leaders and the organizational structure of leadership development offices and departments (Department of the Army staff to the institutional schoolhouses).[13]

The problem of high operational tempo is an issue for the Army to solve at the senior levels and is not applicable to being fixed at the institutional schoolhouse. Therefore, to improve morale, the institutional schoolhouse should improve the individual leadership skills which includes character development, modifying the leadership development structure and improving the quantity/quality of instructors. These improvements could establish an Army "learning environment" culture starting in the schoolhouse that systematically focuses energy and effort on leadership improvement. During the 1980's, the Army developed the After Action Review (AAR) that established a culture of learning in order to improve training. This same type of learning environment can be established in the schoolhouse in order to improve individual leadership development.[14]

This paper will review some of the significant problems being faced by the Army. In chapter II, I will analyze problems in officer morale. These problems will show the need for effective counseling, coaching and mentoring between the leaders and the led. The need for character development, restructuring leadership development offices/departments and improving the shortcomings of instructors in the schoolhouse. I will demonstrate how the Army currently develops its officers in the schoolhouses at the Captain's Career Course, Combined Arms and Services Staff School and the Command & General Staff Officer Course.

In chapter III, I will explain a theoretical framework to help address officer leadership development in the institutional training and education system. The Army currently does not have a theoretical framework to model as it develops its leaders. Its important to establish a working framework that should take place as we examine the type of leadership development in the institutional schoolhouse that will improve morale, retention and effectiveness for the entire Army. This framework is applicable to the schoolhouse or the operational Army. It involves the aspects of Knowledge + Experience + Feedback + Time = Leadership Development.

In chapter IV, I will layout the framework for an improved leadership development system that includes modifying the structure of offices and departments that are involved in leadership development. I will address changes to leadership courses for the Captains Career Course, CAS[3] and CGSOC. Changes will include improving the quality of instructors in the schoolhouse.

Overall, the Army has done extremely well in training officers in the tactical and technical skills but it can do much better in educating and training officers in developing themselves and their subordinates. This adjusted focus will cause increased morale which will lead to improved retention and effectiveness for the United States Army.

CHAPTER II

PROBLEMS FACING THE ARMY

The Army has under gone significant changes in the last decade of the 20th Century. These changes, since the fall of the Berlin Wall, are similar to what takes place after a major war. Personnel strengths and organizational structure have been sharply reduced for the first time in fifty years with a dramatic increase in training exercises and deployments. The Army is faced with many morale issues: high operational tempo, officers leaving the Army in record numbers, disgruntled officers, inefficient organizational structures and an increasing lack of trust between the led and the leaders. The Army's leadership and leadership development is not all that it should be.

Recent studies have concluded, "present leader development and promotion systems, however, are not up to the task of consistently identifying and advancing highly competent leaders".[15] These studies are a disappointing indictment of an institution that takes great pride in "growing" its own successful leaders. According to the Army's draft operational doctrine, Field Manual 3-0 Operations (DRAG Edition), leadership is the most essential dynamic of combat power.[16] An Army without quality leadership is likely to be doomed for failure. The military members of the United States take great pride serving in the military. In a recent survey by the independent think tank, The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), the most agreed upon response from over 11,000 respondents was their pride serving in America's armed forces.[17] Soldiers are proud of what they do, but want to be better and have their organizations and their leaders succeed.

In the area of leadership development, how can the institutional schoolhouse fix these morale problems being faced by today's Army? Specially, the Army can improve individual officer leadership development, character development and the organizational structure/manning (Department of the Army staff to the schoolhouses).

7

There is a significant failure of communications throughout all levels of the chain of command. A common theme through recent studies illustrates a lack of officers being coached, counseled or mentored effectively.[18] Company grade officers leaving the service cite the poor quality of Army leadership.[19] Majors attending the Command & General Staff Officer Course mention frustrations in a failure of personal counseling, mentoring and constructive feedback.[20] Let's now analyze some of the problems affecting officer morale.

Captains Leaving Service:

One of the symptoms of poor officer morale is the number of Captains leaving the service. The Army is being faced with the highest amount of captains leaving the service in recent memory. The high number of graduates of the United States Military Academy leaving at the sixth and the eleventh years of service is at the highest level it has been in more than fifty years. Data from the Army Research Institute shows that 59 percent of USMA graduates remain on active duty at six years of service. This number drops to 33 percent at eleven years of service.[21] These officers should be the core of the long term serving Army officers. The high degree of resources invested in a USMA graduate by the nation should be reflected by long-term service to the Army. Perhaps the cadets are disappointed by the caliber of officer leadership in the operational Army after interacting with specially selected officers at the USMA.

The dramatic increase in Captains leaving the Army has gone from 6.7 percent in 1989 (the end of the Cold War) to 10.6 percent in 1999 (58 percent increase from 1989) to a predicted leap to 13 percent in 2000.[22] Captains leaving complain about a lack of meaningful mentoring during their years of service.[23] All officers, especially junior officers, are hungry for personal and professional development and coaching. Mentoring and coaching not only improves the individual officer and unit, but it helps internalize the Army values within the officer and improves communications throughout the chain of command. An officer who receives effective coaching and mentoring would seem less likely to leave the service at the end of his service

obligation. Effective time spent with a subordinate is a sign of care and concern. Company grade officers believe the Junior Officer Development Form (JODSF) introduced in 1997 to assist with improving counseling with junior leaders (Lieutenants) is not used as a counseling and developmental tool, but instead, is used mostly as a "check the block" exercise.[24] The Army has introduced some good products on counseling and development (FM 22-100, JODSF, Counseling Web site) to assist leaders that do not seem to be utilized based on the leadership feedback from the Captains and Majors.

Forty-Percent of company grade officers are undecided about their future career intentions with staying in the Army.[25] It is imperative for the Army to improve the quality of officer leadership in order to improve morale and retain it's great human investment. Improved leadership development in the schoolhouse is one of the keys to success.

Complaints from CGSOC Majors:

Another symptom of poor officer morale is comments from disgruntled Majors. Complaints made by Army officer students from the Command & General Staff College to the Army Chief of Staff, General Eric Shinseki, in the spring of 2000, brought to life many of the issues being faced by the Army as a whole. In response to the discontent he heard at Ft. Leavenworth, General Shinseki convened a special "blue ribbon" panel (Army Training & Leadership Development Panel-ATLDP) in the spring of 2000 to address these issues brought up by these officers. This panel was focused on improving leadership and training throughout the Army. The results of this board are supposed to be released in Spring 2001.[26] As may be the case anytime when peers gather in a school environment there may be a more pronounced vocal tendency for discontent and unhappiness than in a unit assignment. Nevertheless, the comments made by Majors at the Command & General Staff College in the spring of 2000 were significant in the depth of their discontent. One of the common complaints was the lack of one-on-one counseling, coaching and mentoring.[27] Comments such as, raters and senior raters being terrified of counseling and some

9

CGSOC students claimed they had only been counseled twice in their fourteen years of service. One of those times had been by their academic counselor and evaluator at CGSOC.[28] Officers were disappointed with little development time with their raters and senior raters, but they were also disappointed with the quality of these officers.[29] Officers received to what most of them considered "checklist" or check the block leadership development lacking in quantity or quality.[30] There are common complaints that the Officer Efficiency Report (OER) is strictly an evaluation tool and is not used as a counseling device to develop officers.[31] Leaders are spending more time with subordinates in career management rather than helping the officer's individual development.[32] Career management is important in planning career paths and assignments but it is just one aspect of individual development. On the other hand, some of the CGSOC officers stated prior to the Chief of Staffs' visit that one of the four significant reasons they stayed in the Army was leadership and mentorship they had personally received or had seen.[33]

The Army has not succeeded in properly developing its officers. Most Lieutenants, Captains and Majors do not believe they receive proactive leader development from their seniors. For many officers, their best developers have been their NCO's. [34]

Leadership: Character & Values:

A third factor contributing to poor officer morale is leadership not exhibiting the examples of Army values. The changing face of American society has impacted the development of leaders in the Army. The Army and all the military services are held in record high opinion. A significant number of officers joining the Army today are coming from family and social situations that do not offer a firm foundation or values that may have existed in a larger number of officers a few years ago. Additionally, comments from surveys communicate a failure by even more experienced leaders in the Army to demonstrate acceptable Army values (loyalty, duty, respect, self-less service, honor, integrity and personal/moral courage). Officers entering the service are reflecting the society they defend. The Army is receiving more officers coming from single

10

parent or two career families with values shaped by MTV and "role model" rappers such as "EMINEM". The Army values, at times, conflict with the values formed in the civilian society. The new generations, "X and Y", have less respect for authority figures from an impeached President on down.[35] John Hillen in his article, "Must US Military Culture Reform?" states that "To many observers, the values and social mores of 1990s America-narcissistic, morally relativist, self-indulgent, hedonistic, consumerist, individualistic, victim-centered, nihilistic, and soft-seems hopelessly at odds with those of traditional military culture."[36] The Army values set the foundation of character that are essential in developing leaders and their subordinates. Values are the anchor of character and organizations. A leader with faulty character is not the type of leader the Army wants developing subordinates. Effective leadership development is about duty, integrity and selfless service; not for self, but for your subordinates and success of the organization. As one USMC instructor commented, "the Marine Corps taught me values--not just words: Honor, courage, commitment, fidelity, integrity. Not just using them, but actually practicing them. Out in the civilian world, those words do not even get mentioned. I'll say, 'Integrity,' and they'll say 'What kind of shit you talking? You done got brainwashed in the Marine Corps.'"[37] The disconnect of values between the military and civilian society makes it even more important for the institutional schoolhouse to reinforce Army values throughout an officers' schooling. Army values must be continually role modeled and reinforced through coaching and counseling. The fault assumption is made many times that individual values are congruent with Army values. Additionally, the institutional schoolhouse focuses more on ethics, sexual harassment and consideration of others training than on other Army values.[38] Army values are important not only as tools for character development but as a bind that strengthens the individual and the organizations.

Three common themes seem to emerge on leadership development. How do we improve leaders? First, the Army needs to assist officers to "know thy self" better as they progress

11

through the Army. All officers have a perception of whom they are but it may be disconnected with reality. There may be four different perspectives from self, leaders, peers and subordinates on a leader's effectiveness. For many officers, the first time they receive detailed personal assessment feedback is at the Army War College after over twenty years in the Army.[39] This is probably too late for many officers. The institutional schoolhouse at the Captains Career Course (C^3), CAS^3 and CGSOC with recent feedback from operational assignment is an ideal place to receive, reflect and fix personal assessment of leadership skills. Officers at these three schools are at a critical road junction in their military and personal life that constructive and specific feedback will assist in their professional leadership development.

Secondly, it is important for an officer to know how to coach, counsel, provide feedback and mentor his subordinates. The Army talks a lot about coaching and counseling but needs much improvement in this area as we have seen in comments from Captains and Majors. Effective time spent with subordinates is time well spent and an investment for the future. Leadership development is relationship focused that takes time.[40]

Thirdly, officers at all levels, especially at the junior levels, need focused education and training on Army values. We assume many times that new officers enter the Army and journey through the system with a firm foundation of values. The effective socialization of Army values can be a powerful tool for individual and organizational effectiveness. Character is the core of effective leadership.

Now, let's move on to the Army's organizational structure for leadership development and examine how leadership development is structured from the top down. How leadership development is structured throughout the Army is important in understanding how leadership development is taught in the institutional schoolhouse.

The Army's Organizational Structure for Leadership Development:

An additional factor affecting poor officer morale is the weak organizational structure for leadership development through much of the Army. We have reviewed some of the problems in Army leadership development from the view of the Captains/Majors and examined character development. How is leadership development organized from the Department of the Army staff down to the institutional schoolhouse? What are some of the difficulties in the organizational structure for leadership development?

The Army's officer leadership development system begins at the Department of the Army in the office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (DCSPER). Leadership Development is a Division within the Directorate of Human Resources in DCSPER. The Leadership Division has four branches: equal opportunity, command policy, women in the Army and leadership. The leadership branch is focused on the MacArthur Award (awarded annually to outstanding company grade officers) and proponency for AR 600-100, Army Leadership.[41] Additionally, the leadership division is responsible for coordination of leadership development among the key players, TRADOC (Training and Doctrine Command) at Ft. Monroe, Virginia, the Center for Army Leadership (CAL) at Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas, the United States Military Academy at West Point, New York, the Sergeant's Major Academy at Ft. Bliss, Texas and the Army Research Institute located at Alexandria, Virginia.[42] The leadership division is currently working on what role DCSPER should take in leadership and leader development. The Leadership Division has nineteen slots with twelve slots dedicated toward sexual harassment and equal opportunity with only a Lieutenant Colonel and two Majors serving as leadership officers.[43] The personnel numbers demonstrates a narrow focus on one component of leadership development, sexual harassment and equal opportunity. Leadership development, which is applicable to both personnel and operations, is stove-piped on the Army Staff in the human resource side of

13

DCSPER. This causes problems in that DCSPER will normally be oriented toward making personnel management changes rather than developing leadership solutions.[44]

After the Army staff, the next level of leadership development is the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) at Ft. Monroe, which has responsibility for all of the Army's schoolhouses. At the major command level, leadership development is located on the operations and training side of the staff. Leadership development at TRADOC has management oversight for all aspects of leadership development and personnel issues in the Army's training arena with a staff of three that focus on commissioned officer training, one for warrant officers, three for NCO's and six staff members who handle civilian leadership training.[45]

The next level of leadership development is the Deputy Commandant, Command & General Staff College, who has the responsibility for leadership development for the entire Army. Working directly for the Deputy Commandant is the Center for Army Leadership (CAL) who's mission is to "improve Army leadership by influencing leader development" and it's purpose, "(The) Center for Army Leadership orchestrates the development, execution, and evaluation of current and future leadership and leader development initiatives across the Army."[46] The director of CAL works for the Deputy Commandant of CGSC who serves as the Army's Chief of Staff Executive Agent for Leader Development.[47] The Deputy Commandant, in addition to running CGSC which includes CGSOC, CAS³, SAMS (School of Advanced Military Studies) and the SCP (School for Command Preparation) serves as the Army's "Deputy Chair of Leadership."[48] In this position, he is responsible for developing, coordinating, executing Army leadership development actions plans and keeping strategic and senior Army leadership informed on the Army's leadership development programs (LDP).[49] Additionally, the Deputy Commandant has the responsibility to maintain currency of leadership and leadership development doctrine, ensure leadership manuals are published for officers, warrant officers and non-commissioned officers and use CAL as a coordinating staff for leadership actions. It would seem to be extremely

difficult for the Deputy Commandant, even with a well-trained and qualified staff (LDO-Leadership Development Office within CAL serves as the Deputy Commandant's leadership development staff), to give the appropriate focus to leadership development along with his many other duties and responsibilities. Additionally, the LDO staff is stretched having only five out of thirteen authorized positions filled.[50]

The Center for Army Leadership (CAL) has the responsibility to develop the common leadership core instruction for the Army's institutional schoolhouses, develop leadership doctrine, instruct leadership to CGSOC students and assist the Deputy Commandant in his role as executive agent for the Army Chief of Staff. CAL has six offices or divisions.[51]

The Center for Army Leadership assists in the leadership development of Army civilians through the teams from CAL's Civilian Leadership & Training Division (CLTD) who travel throughout the Army developing the middle management of the Army's civilian force. Additionally, the Military Law Office that instructs CGSOC students falls into CAL because it seems there is no other place in CGSC to put it.

The Leadership Research & Assessment Division (LRAD) of CAL is involved in conducting leadership research and assessments throughout the Army. As of 5 March 2001, LRAD had four out of four authorized positions filled but not with the correct personnel.[52] One of its more recent responsibilities has been testing programs such as the 360 feedback assessment.[53] This program takes feedback from a number of an individual's peers, subordinates, leaders and self in order to give officer's a better understanding of their abilities and capabilities. The feedback from the 360 assessment has had very good results in selected Army field units but due to money constraints and lack of senior officer support it has been difficult to extend the process further throughout the Army.[54] A limited 360 is conducted at CAS[3] and CGSOC. In these two courses, the 360 feedback is conducted by gathering self-assessment and five student peer reports from within the small group. LRAD is involved with the 360 assessment in CGSOC but has no

15

involvement with the CAS[3] 360 assessment.[55] LRAD's involvement in the 360 degree assessment with CGSOC and not CAS[3] is another example of poor leadership development integration. Additionally, LRAD has sent teams to the Combat Training Centers (CTC) to give leaders feedback on their leadership ability while going through their intense training rotation. There are great developmental possibilities in using training events to assist in leadership development. We critique leaders on tactical aspects of warfighting, why not do the same with a leadership component of the battlefield operating system (BOS)?

The Leadership Development Office (LDO) in CAL serves as a special staff for the Deputy Commandant in his role as the executive agent for the Army Chief of Staff for leadership development. LDO assesses, develops, coordinates and monitors all leadership issues from concept to completion.[56]

The primary focus of the Leadership Instruction Division (LID) is instructing leadership to the CGSOC officers during their one-year course. Additionally, besides developing and teaching these courses, officers from LID with a contractor were the writers of the latest addition of the Army's capstone leadership manual, FM 22-100, Army Leadership, in 1999.[57]

CAL's Leadership Education & Training Development Division (LETDD) has the responsibility for developing the common core leadership instruction for officer pre-commissioning, officer basic courses, captains career courses, all warrant officer courses and NCO development courses from primary leader development course (PLDC) to the advanced NCO course (ANCOC).[58] LETDD currently has six out of twelve authorized positions filled with future cuts expected.[59]

The organizational structure for leadership development at the Department of the Army level, DCSPER, and TRADOC shows a significant shortage of personnel directly focused on leadership development. The Army lacks a holistic integration of officer leadership development in staffs, training, education, efficiency reports and personnel management. The Army in the OPMS XXI

Final Report (9 July 1997) states in one of it's key recommendations is to have the Army "adopt a holistic approach by linking officer personnel management, character and leader development, and the Officer Evaluation Report (OER) into a total Officer Development system (ODS) XXI."[60] The OPMS XXI recommendation does not go far enough in linking leadership development with all aspects of the Army. The leadership division chief's main focus in DCSPER is not leadership development. Another difficulty is the lack of horizontal or vertical integration of leadership and leadership development throughout the Army organization structure and staffs. There is no link to the field through Forces Command or other major commands. The Deputy Commandant, CGSC, at Ft. Leavenworth and the Director, Center for Army Leadership (CAL) have leadership development as just one more rock in their rucksack of many things to do. A stronger emphasis and better integration for leadership development throughout the Army would help improve what is taught in the schoolhouse. What does leadership development look like as we examine the Captains Career Course, CAS[3] and CGSOC?

Captains Career Course:

The Captains Career Course is another area that should improve some aspects of its leadership development process. The Captains Career Course takes places at the different branch service schools throughout the Army. The career course is for junior captains to learn the basic requirements to be company commanders and staff officers primarily at battalion and brigade level. As a point of reference, the directed common core for the Officer Basic Courses is 183.2 hours with 26.3 hours devoted to leadership development courses. The Captain's Career Course has a total of 145.4 common core hours including 21.3 hours of leadership instruction. Figure 1 lists the leadership common core taught in the Officer Basic Courses (OBC) and the Captains Career Courses (CCC).[61] What is not included is the informal time spent discussing leadership issues and concerns with peers and instructors. Each branch is different on the length of their courses. The Infantry Captains Career Course (IC[3]) is eighteen weeks long with 580 hours out of

17

a total 744 spent in their normal staff group of 16-18.[62] All of the formal leadership instruction in

ICCC (14 hours, 7.3 hours less than the directed common core, Figure 1, for the ICCC leadership

hours of instruction) is conducted by leadership branch instructors in large class instruction of

120 students.[63]

Common Core Curriculum (Officer Basic Course & Captain Career Course)

Officer Basic Course Leadership Common Core
Counsel subordinates, (3 hrs) Task # 158-100-1260
Apply the ethical decision making process at small unit level, (3.3 hrs) Task # 158-100-1230
Communicate effectively as a leader, (2 hrs) Task # 158-100-1240
Motivate subordinates to accomplish unit missions, (3 hrs) Task # 158-100-1250
Develop subordinate leaders in a platoon, (2 hrs) Task # 158-100-1271
Develop cohesive platoon size organization, (3 hrs) Task # 158-100-1272
Solve problems using the military problem solving process, (3 hrs) Task # 158-100-1281
Take charge of a platoon, (3 hrs) Task # 158-100-1282
Implement measures to reduce combat stress, (2.3 hrs) Task # 158-100-1285
21.6 Total Hours

Captains Career Course Leadership Common Core	*ICCC*
Apply the ethical decision making process as a cdr/ldr, (2 hrs) Task # 158-100-1331	2 hrs.
Establish a positive command climate, (3 hrs) Task # 158-100-1332	1 hr.
Take charge of a company/staff section, (3 hrs) Task # 158-100-1333	1 hr.
Communicate effectively as unit or staff leader, (1 hr) Task # 158-100-1340	1 hr.
Develop a unit counseling program, (4 hrs) Task # 158-100-1361	1 hr.
Build a cohesive unit or organization, (3 hrs) Task # 158-100-1372	2 hrs.
Develop subordinates leaders in a company, (3 hrs) Task # 158-100-1373	2 hrs.
Implement measures to reduce operational stress, (2.3 hrs) Task # 158-100-1385	2 hrs.
21.3 Total Hours	12 hrs.

** ICCC has additionally 2 hours of Army Family Team Building (AFTB)

Figure 1

The small group instructors in ICCC counsel the students individually three times during the

course using peer feedback received during the course.[64] The ICCC leadership classes are fairly

boring according to the leadership branch chief.[65] Currently at ICCC, six out of the ten Small

Group Instructors (SGI) are U.S. Army Captains, two are U.S. Army Majors, one is a U.S.M.C

Major and one is a Australian Major.[66]

The Armor Captains Career Course (AC^3) has student small groups from 12-15 officers.

Currently, the AC^3 has fourteen staff group leaders with six positions filled by Captains and the

remainder by Majors (including two Majors each from the United Kingdom and Australia). Officers in the AC^3 will normally receive formal counseling four times during the course from their staff group leader. Not a formal process, but many staff group leaders at AC^3 conduct some type of peer input having the students rank order their peers and themselves on three-five characteristics associated with being a "model captain". [67]

Combined Arms and Services Staff School-CAS³

An Army institutional school that is demonstrating some good aspects of leadership development but may be eliminated in the next few years is the Combined Arms and Services Staff School (CAS^3). The Combined Arms and Services Staff School (CAS^3) is a six week course that is currently attended by captains immediately upon completion of their career course. CAS^3 was developed on feedback from the Army's 1978 Review of Education and Training of Officers (RETO) Study, the first class graduated in 1981.[68] The course is designed to prepare staff officers. The CAS^3 course was changed from nine weeks to six in 1996 in an attempt to better integrate with the branch schools. The goals of CAS^3 are to improve ability to analyze and solve military problems, improve communication skills, improve the ability to interact and coordinate as a member of a staff and improve an understanding of Army organizations, operations, and procedures.[69]

The primary focus of CAS^3 is to develop officers into an efficient planning staff that uses the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) as their main tool. The staff group of one instructor and normally fifteen officers from all of the different Army branches rotate through different staff positions in order to give them a variety of experiences. Students are evaluated daily from their staff group leader who is normally a lieutenant colonel or senior major. When CAS^3 first began in the early 1980's, the intent was to have former battalion commanders as staff group leaders. Unfortunately, this intention has disappeared in recent years with competing demands on former

battalion commanders in other assignments.[70] In recent years due to personnel shortages, CAS[3] has contracted recently retired officers to serve as instructors.[71]

Twice during the course, the staff group leader will conduct two detailed counseling sessions with the students. In the first counseling session, the instructor works with the student on a career development time line and developmental action plan to work on individual development. Near the end of course, the last counseling focuses on performance during the course and following up on the career development time line and the developmental action plan developed during the course.[72] Additionally, students fill out a self-development assessment and receive peer feedback to assist them in their individual development.

CAS[3] offers a great opportunity within the institutional schoolhouse for experienced senior officers' to counsel, coach and mentor their students. The schoolhouse is a great learning environment void of many of the inhibitions and attributions associated in an operational assignment. Additionally, it incorporates feedback from peers and the staff group leader to assist the officer in developing a leader development program. One of the strengths of the Combined Arms Service Staff School at Ft. Leavenworth is the seniority of the instructors (Majors and Lieutenant Colonels) teaching the Captains at the six-week course. The next significant military school an officer will attend after CAS[3] will be the Command & General Staff Officer Course (CGSOC).

Command & General Staff Officer Course-CGSOC

The Command & General Staff Officer Course is currently at a significant crossroads in reexamining its structure for all of its courses and organization. Officers, if selected attend at the ten to fourteen years of service CGSOC at Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas or equivalent course with the Navy, Marines or Air Force.[73]

Students in their seventeen-eighteen people staff groups have an academic counselor and evaluator (ACE) who is assigned to the group for the entire year. The ACE will normally be an

instructor who will be responsible for instructing the group in one of their core courses (tactics, logistics, joint operations, history, leadership). The ACE is responsible for writing the officers end of the year academic efficiency report and sitting down with the officer to conduct counseling, normally twice during the year.[74] CGSOC initiated an experimental Mentor's Program during school year 2000-2001.[75]

Since the 1998-1999 school year, CGSOC students conducted peer feedback that was more informal than what occurs in CAS[3]. Students filled out a self-assessment and receive five peer reports from other students in their staff group. The students do not receive the feedback one-on-one with an instructor but review it on their own in their leadership course.[76] During the year, CGSOC spouses are afforded the opportunity to attend the three-day Personal Awareness and Leadership Seminar (sponsored by the School for Command Preparation). This seminar focuses on the spouses' personality style (Myers-Briggs Type Indicator), leadership style and problem solving.[77] Student officers' could benefit from these assessment instruments that are available to their spouses but not to them.

The primary leadership instruction in CGSOC is the core course, C700-Fundamental of Excellence: Character & Competence, taken in the fall of the yearlong course. This course consists of thirty hours of leadership instruction with nine lessons ranging from two to four hours each.[78] Three hours out of a total of thirty hours is spent reviewing and discussing individual leadership development. In an attempt to cover so many areas of leadership development, the course covers a lot of ground without any specific focus. The remainder of C700 consists of fourteen hours of military law, three hours of Public Affairs and seventeen hours of training management. C700 becomes the collection bin for miscellaneous courses.

Another difficulty the institutional schoolhouse faces is the shortage of qualified instructors. Instructors are the center of gravity to success in military education. The institution may have the state of the art learning facilities and the best program of instruction but it is the instructor's

and his engagement or lack of engagement that will cause success or failure. Instructing at any level in the institutional schoolhouse is not considered career enhancing. Eliot Cohen in his article, "Defending America in the Twenty-first Century" states that "Service on their military faculties usually indicates a career coming to an end, and officers who acquire doctorates or write books do so as a hobby---often at the expense of their careers rather than to their benefit."[79]

The Command & General Staff College staff and faculty lost 15 officer slots (Majors, Lieutenant Colonel, Colonel) in its Officer Distribution Plan (ODP) in 2000.[80] Additionally, the Command & General Staff College is significantly short instructors.[81] For example, CGSOC and CAS[3] are one hundred and ten instructors short of what is required. Officers will normally serve a two-year tour and then be reassigned. Qualifications to be an instructor at the career course, CAS[3] or CGSOC are satisfactory completion of normal duty assignments followed by normally an institutional and department train-up period of a few days. The majority of instructors at the Command and General Staff Officer Course at Ft. Leavenworth are Majors and Lieutenant Colonels. The majority of the faculty has been branch qualified as Majors, while others are non-resident graduates of CGSOC. For example, in the Leadership Instruction Division that instructs CGSOC students, as of 2 February 2001, LID has thirteen out of sixteen authorized instructors. Out of these thirteen, seven are Lieutenant Colonels and six are Majors. Additionally, six instructors are resident graduates of CGSOC, while six instructors are non-resident graduates and one instructor (Chaplain who teaches ethics to the CGSOC students) is a graduate of neither. No former battalion commanders instruct leadership courses at CGSOC.[82] Very few former battalion commanders instruct throughout CGSC. Is there a credibility problem with non-resident CGSOC graduates instructing resident graduates?

The priority set by the Army Chief of Staff in 2000, to ensure that specific operational units were filled to 100 percent manning has negatively impacted the institutional schoolhouses in filling its manning requirements for instructors.[83] Less qualified instructors' impacts the already

22

shortage of instructors in the classroom education, formal and informal interaction. Additionally, it greatly restricts the ability to conduct effective after course reviews and develop new programs of instruction.

The United States Army institutional schoolhouse from the Captains Career Course, CAS[3] to CGSOC is primarily focused on the tactical and technical skills training for officers prior to their assuming positions as company commanders, staff officers and battalion commanders. Leadership instruction is formally taught in many cases and is not embedded throughout the courses of the officer institutional schoolhouses.

Changing leadership development in the institutional schoolhouse offers a great opportunity for officers to receive specific feedback on their leadership abilities from their prior assignment as they prepare for their next assignment. Not only will officers learn more about their own development, they will also become better able to develop their subordinates. Everyone wants to be a valued member of the organization and time spent developing an individual is effort toward improving professionalism. What is more personal than your own development? Failure in interpersonal skills and character within an organization can seldom survive the brilliance of tactical or technical skills.

We have reviewed some of the problems on leadership development expressed by the Captains and Majors. We have examined the importance of Army values in officer leadership development. We have identified an organizational structure that lacks integration and priority in leadership development. The Army's institutional schoolhouse does many things well but falls short on qualified instructors and is trying to cover too many broad leadership topics. Let's now examine a leadership theoretical framework that will assist us as we analyze how the institution can improve leadership development. The institutional schoolhouse can be the agent of change for improved leadership development. To understand the developmental process, we must examine the current Army model of leadership development and see how a new theoretical

framework may help improve what is happening in the schoolhouse which in turn will improve

morale and therefore improve retention and effectiveness in the United States Army.

24

CHAPTER III

LEADERSHIP DEVELOPMENT THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Understanding changes in schoolhouse leadership development requires examining its

fundamental aspects. The Army provides four key documents for officer leadership

development.[84] All of these documents provide important information on leadership

development, but none of them provides an effective integrated theoretical framework for the

leadership development process. A framework is necessary to bring coherence and integration to

leadership development. DA Pamphlet 350-58 does provide one model (Figure 2) of the Army's

Leader Development system. This model was briefly mentioned in chapter I of the paper. It

displays leader development being supported by the three pillars of institutional training and

education, operational assignments and self-development. This model provides a framework but

not a leadership development *process*.

DA Pamphlet 350-58, *Leader Development for America's Army*, DA, October 1994, Figure 1, page 5.

Figure 2

Another model (Figure 3) is the Army's leadership foundation (FM 22-100) of Be, Know and Do. It is alternatively described by a leaders' values, attributes, skills and actions. The leader's internal qualities of values define character ("Be"), the most important element of a leader.[85] Many of these values are developed prior to an officer entering the Army, but many can be developed or reinforced during an officer's service. The institutional schoolhouse can provide an excellent training ground to further develop officers' Army values. An officer can fall short in many areas but a failure of character is inexcusable for an organization that is built upon values. Another part of this model, "Know" includes interpersonal, conceptual, tactical and technical skills. Effective self-knowledge is an important aspect to have before you can successfully develop others.[86] The last component of this model, "Do" includes actions of the leader (influencing, operating, improving). The Army, for the most part, does very well in the "Action" aspect of the model but at times "Actions" are deficient due to an orientation of short-term measurable results at the expense of long-term successes.[87]

THE LEADER
of character and competence acts to achieve excellence
FIELD MANUAL 22-100, June 1999

"BE"		"KNOW"	"DO"
VALUES	ATTRIBUTES	SKILLS	ACTIONS
Loyalty Duty Respect Selfless Service Honor Integrity Personal Courage	Mental Physical Emotional	Interpersonal Conceptual Technical Tactical	Influencing • Communicating • Decision Making • Motivating Operating • Plan/Prep • Executing • Assessing Improving • Developing • Building • Learning

Figure 3

26

The Army's models from DA 350-58 and FM 22-100 illustrate different leadership development frameworks, however these two different frameworks do not demonstrate a leadership development process. It is necessary to examine two other models in order to develop a process for leadership development.

By combining these two models, a more understandable leadership development process emerges. The framework in Figure 4 is based on LTC Don Craig's model that he used in his article, "Designing a Battalion Leadership Program" published in the May/June 1999, *Military Review*.[88] The Army does not have a theoretical leadership development process.[89] Colonel Joe LeBoeuf, Professor, Department of Behavioral Sciences & Leadership (BS & L), United States Military Academy, advocates a model of leadership development based on his study in this area. His illustrates the following model: Knowledge + Experience + Feedback + Time = Leadership Development.[90] Figure 4 displays Colonel LeBoeuf's four processes integrated within the framework LTC Craig depicts in his article. Additionally, this new model provides clarity in examining the problem and developing solutions for leadership development in the officer schoolhouse. Figure 4 will be used extensively in chapter 4 to explain changes necessary for leadership development in the officer schoolhouse. The author believes the instructor is the center of gravity. The instructor and the specific components within each process will be explained further in the next chapter.

The four processes will assist us in understanding leadership development. Before we examine the specifics within each process let us examine the four processes: Knowledge + Experience + Feedback + Time = Leadership Development.

TIME

KNOWLEDGE

Observe
Listen
Read
Discuss

Reflect

Assemble

360 Degree Feedback

Feedback
-
Reflection

Counsel, Coach, Mentor

Developmental Action Plan (DAP)

Knowledge

Counseling Skills

Character

Army Values

Embedded Leadership

Instructor

Analyze
Learn
Create New Approaches

Modify

Review

EXPERIENCE
Simulate

Learning Progression

Plan Experiences

Leadership Vignettes

Figure 4

Knowledge:

Knowledge is the first step in the process of gathering information through formal and informal settings. Learning occurs through the analysis and synthesis of the information. Knowledge is a cognitive domain of learning involving mental judgment and reasoning, whereas skills are in the action domain of learning. Skills demonstrate knowledge in action. Learning occurs throughout the four processes. The process of knowledge relates directly with the leadership competence of "Know".[91]

What knowledge is important for Army leaders to have? Of course, military leaders must have tactical and technical expertise. At CGSOC, student officers receive more than 400 hours in the core curriculum on tactics, but only 30 hours devoted to leadership.[92] A shortcoming in the Army is the lack of knowledge of interpersonal skills and developing actions for subordinates and self. Currently, an officer's interpersonal skills and actions are formed informally and without the dedicated focus as tactical and technical skills. The institutional schoolhouse's main focus is on technical and tactical skills for the next level of operational assignments rather than on individual

28

leadership assessment, improving actions, character and interpersonal skills development.[93] *The Army assumes a level of leadership development at different officer levels without a formal process to provide integrated feedback from self, peers, seniors and subordinates on the individual's effectiveness.*

Experience:

Leaders receive their most important development through their experience in operational assignments. Self-development is normally left to individual discretion. The Army's weakness in providing direction and guidance for officer self-development is outside the scope of this paper. Based on the author's survey of material beyond the Army Chief of Staff's professional reading list, nothing in the Army provides structure or guidance for self-development. The Army did attempt to implement a program in the late 1980's and early 1990's, the officer Military Qualification Standards (MQS) system as the "primary implementation vehicle of self-development" which did not succeed at all.[94]

The institutional schoolhouse is an ideal place to assess past performances and improve upon operational experiences. The schoolhouse can assist student officers in analyzing past experiences and preparing for future assignments. The schoolhouse is a "open" environment that should afford the opportunity to think and reflect. The schoolhouse should allow more time for reflection on personal strengths and weaknesses. In addition, sharing experiences and receiving feedback from peers and seniors is very beneficial within this environment. Modern technology allows the opportunity to increase experiences, feedback opportunities by developing experiential simulation leadership vignettes similar to what has been developed for the Initial Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) at Ft. Lewis.[95]

Feedback:

Feedback (counseling, coaching, mentoring) is critical to assisting individual change. Feedback individuals receive allows them to sustain and build upon strengths, but most

important, to fix weaknesses. Feedback from leaders, peers and subordinates is a critical aspect for individual development, but Army officers are not pleased with the amount of performance feedback they receive. They normally have to wait until they are senior lieutenant colonels attending the Army War College before they receive personal in-depth leadership feedback.[96] For the majority of these officers, this type of feedback earlier in their careers would have been more beneficial for their own development and so they could learn how to give effective feedback. Experienced and qualified instructors in the schoolhouse are instrumental role models for giving effective feedback. One strength of CAS^3 is the experience level of a senior major or lieutenant colonel giving feedback to a junior captain. Instructors working with student officers could develop developmental action plans (DAP), similar to those in CAS^3, for the students to work on in the schoolhouse and take with them to their next assignment.

Time:

Making these processes successful requires dedication -- time and effort. Institutional training has to balance the time spent on tactical/technical skills with the time focused on leadership development activities. How institutional training time is budgeted is a clear example of what the institution considers important. How the time is used and what is taught during "leadership instruction" is important in making improvements in the schoolhouse.

We have reviewed two of the Army's models for leadership development from DA 350-58 and FM 22-100. By combining two models from LTC Craig and Colonel LeBoeuf we have developed a revised framework of knowledge, experience, feedback and time that can guide changes in officer leadership development. Focused changes to leadership development in the officer institutional schoolhouse will improve morale, increase officer retention and promote effectiveness. We will now examine changes in leadership development from organizational structure, instructors in the schoolhouse to the four processes.

CHAPTER IV

OFFICER LEADERSHIP DEVELOPMENT FOR THE 21ST CENTURY
LEADERSHIP TRANSFORMATION

The most significant change the Army can make to the institutional schoolhouse is improving individual leadership development. This improvement includes leadership and character development and changes within the organizational structure/manning (Department of the Army staff to the schoolhouses). Officers must have improved assessment and feedback on their individual leadership qualities to improve their ability to lead but also to help better develop their subordinates' leadership abilities.

Institutional change needs to focus on the Captains Career Course, CAS[3] and CGSOC. These schools have an enormous impact on the remainder of officer's remaining service. The institutional schoolhouse can be an effective agent of change in improving morale and helping inspire officers to stay in the service after their initial service obligation. The essential issue is officer morale. Improved morale would increase retention and organizational effectiveness.

The first area in transforming the institutional schoolhouse is changing the structure in leadership development within the Department of the Army staff to the institutional schoolhouses. Leadership development has become lost in the organizational structure of the Army. Its main purpose seems to be focused primarily on equal opportunity or "consideration of others" types of programs. High maintenance areas such as equal opportunity, women in the Army and other human resource programs need to be reexamined in how they impact on leadership development. The Center for Army Leadership (CAL) at Ft. Leavenworth and the Deputy Commandant who serves as Executive Agent for leadership to the Army Chief of Staff have so many requirements that coordinating an integrated and responsive leadership development program is difficult to accomplish.

The answer lies in modifying the current structure for leadership development. A possible first step in the solution is to modify the current Center for Army Leadership by making it the

Center for Army Leadership Development (CALD). Figure 5 on page 49 displays a new organization that would improve leadership development in the Army. Its mission and purpose would remain to "improve Army leadership by influencing leader development …. CAL orchestrates the development, execution, and evaluation of current and future leadership and leader development initiative across the Army."[97] The value of CALD as a special staff agency headed by a long-term serving Brigadier General reporting directly to the Army Vice Chief of Staff would have a stronger voice in leadership development issues. Additionally, CALD would have not only the support but also the personnel to be an active participant in Army leadership development.

Leadership development must become holistic throughout the Army in training, education, efficiency reports and personnel management. The leadership development organizational structure and the Army's entire training and education system is fertile ground for further research and significant changes in current paradigms.[98] For example, the Officer Personnel Management System (OPMS) would need to undergo significant changes in order to allow officers to serve longer and in different ways than currently allowed. The creation of leadership development into a Career Field Designation (CFD) may be one option for improvement.

The successful integration of leadership development throughout the Army would reduce the need to have the myriad of programs that currently exist. Leadership development must be integrated across staff areas, incorporated into training, personnel management and education with a renewed focus and emphasis to truly develop all leaders in the Army. CALD would truly be focused on leadership development and would be separated from the myriad of other areas that takes away from developing military leaders for the Army. The Military Law Office (MLO) needs to leave CAL to produce a trimmer organization focused on leadership development. The Military Law Office (MLO) would report under the direct control of CGSOC.

CALD would modify its remaining four existing divisions, Leadership

32

Research & Assessment Division (LRAD) with responsibility in working closely with the Army Research Institute (ARI) would gather data and research new approaches to leadership development. Additionally, LRAD would be the responsible agent to develop, implement and execute the 360-degree assessment for CGSOC initially, then other officer schools, NCO school and operational units.

The second division, Leadership Education & Training Development Division (LETDD), would have an expanded role in leadership curriculum having responsibility for all Army officer leadership development curricula. Currently, LETDD is focused on a leadership common core that does not include leadership instruction at CAS^3, CGSOC, the Army War College or the Department of Behavioral Science and Leadership (BS&L) at the United States Military Academy, West Point. Curriculum integration would provide a more focused and improved approach to officer education from pre-commissioning to senior officer. A holistic leadership development system would bring together TRADOC, the Army War College and the USMA. All officer leadership development education from pre-commissioning to senior officer would be integrated together. Furthermore, leadership development would be intertwined throughout the educational system creating a leadership development practicum within all courses. For example, a tactics instructor leads an After Action Review (AAR) on a warfighting simulation exercise and includes a discussion on leadership dynamics.

These issues raise the question for the entire Army education process about disconnects not only in lines of authority, funding and curriculum development but other issues as well. As has been mentioned before TRADOC, the Army War College and the USMA have been competitors for limited resources from funding to instructors. Areas for further research must be focused on breaking old paradigms of military education organizational structure. The lines of authority and responsibility must be clear to avoid further confusion.

The third division in CALD would be LDO (Leadership Development Office). LDO would have responsibility for the Army's leadership doctrine, FM 22-100 and integrating leadership development among officer personnel management, training, officer efficiency reports (OERs) and insitutional instruction. Currently, the Army's leadership development is not integrated among those areas but is stove-piped throughout the Army's officer management, education and training system. Additionally, LDO would have responsibility for the Army's leadership development, center of gravity, C^2M (Counselors, Coaches and Mentors). These active and recently retired officers would be responsible initially for CGSOC students and then branch out to other officer and NCO schoolhouses to train the trainer. Due to the Army's shortage of active duty instructors' recently retired officers would provide the expertise and the stability to the institutional schoolhouse. The use of retired officers to fill active duty shortages may seem like an easy solution but it has shortcomings.[99] The current Leadership Instruction Division (LID) would be integrated within C^2M, responsible for leadership development for the CGSOC students. Their role would primarily be one of counseling, coaching and mentoring rather than just leadership instructors. These officers provide to CGSOC a role similar to what is found at the United States Military Academy with Tactical Officers. USMA Tactical Officers are handpicked and trained to focus on the leadership development for the West Point cadet.[100] Tactical Officers go through a yearlong educational program to specially prepare them for their position as leader developers. The C^2M program at Ft. Leavenworth would provide the same type of trained and focused officer to assist in the leadership development at CGSOC.[101]

The fourth division would be the Civilian Leadership and Training Division (CLTD) that would continue in its role developing Army civilian leadership. Leadership development for the Army civilian work force is an important issue. It is an area that needs to be examined thoroughly. It is beyond the scope of this paper and the author's research to offer any analyze or

34

submit any recommendations concerning civilian leadership development. Army civilian leadership development is definitely an area with great potential for future research.

The Center for Army Leadership Development (CALD) would also have officers and NCO's assigned to the Army staff, TRADOC, FORSCOM, PERSCOM, USMA, Combat Training Centers (CTC) and all major commands to serve as liaison officers. These officers and NCO's would serve as conduits to keep contact with these organizations in better developing and implementing leadership development not only in their specific command but throughout the Army. In order to give added emphasis and continuity to CALD, the organization would be led by a Brigadier General serving a five-year to ten-year tour and reporting directly to the Army Vice Chief of Staff. The Director of CALD would serve in a role similar to a special staff officer who has responsibilities across staff lines. The Army staff already has special staff officers serving as inspector generals and information systems officers.[102] It would be important for this officer to have the operational experience and an educational background that would allow him or her to be prepared for this position. Additionally, the four divisions of LRAD, LETDD, LDO and CLTD would have long term serving Colonels as division chiefs. These Colonels would be serving in their final military assignments. As the Army examines an organizational wide approach to leadership development it also needs to reexamine career tracking and extending qualified officers beyond current retirement dates. Change to leadership development in the institutional schoolhouse begins with the restructuring the organizational structure from the Department of the Army staff to the schoolhouses.

After changes are made within the organizational structure, the next level to examine would be modification in the officer schoolhouse that will enhance leadership development. The new structure described above and shown in Figure 5 would provide an integrated officer leadership development curriculum and programs. We return back to the theoretical model of Figure 4 below to help us as we examine the new officer leadership development system:

Knowledge + Experience + Feedback + Time = Leadership Development

We have examined the four processes earlier. What are the key components within these four processes to improve leadership development? As shown in Figure 4, the center of gravity for the leadership development system is the instructor. The instructor facilitates the learning, serves as a role model and integrates into the education military experiences.[103]

Instructor in the Schoolhouse:

The instructor in the institutional schoolhouse is important to the success of the student. Every instructor needs to be a leadership development instructor, regardless of what area they teach. One of the tough challenges at CAS^3 and CGSOC that was previously mentioned is the shortage of qualified instructors. The Army must assign better and more instructors to the institutional schoolhouse. Quality instructors greatly impact the knowledge, experience and feedback processes.[104] Additionally, students learn through the formal and informal interactions with their instructors. One of the strengths in CAS^3 is the level of seniority the instructor provides the students.[105]

An improved officer institutional schoolhouse instructor level of experience would be to have Majors with recent service as battalion/brigade operations officers and executive officers to serve as Small Group Instructors (SGI) at the Captains Career Course. The Army and CGSOC should make a greater effort to have former battalion commanders as CGSOC instructors. The experience level of a battalion commander is invaluable for the professional military education. One solution for CGSOC that involves changing the leadership development program is to make the focus and priority on recruiting, training, educating and retaining experienced instructors as Counselor, Coach and Mentor (C^2M). Additionally, have the C^2M's present selected leadership courses to their staff groups. Under this new system, the current thirty hours of leadership could be readjusted to allow more time toward individual interaction between the student and the C^2M. It would also be important to embed leadership throughout the CGSOC courses of tactics,

resource management, logistics and history. CGSOC has sixty staff groups with each staff group consisting of about seventeen-eighteen officers. One C^2M would be responsible for two staff groups or about thirty-six officers. This officer would be a Lieutenant Colonel or Colonel preferably with recent command time or a recently retired Lieutenant Colonel or Colonel on a five-year contract renewable up to ten-year contract. Even though the current Mentor's Program has had mixed results it has potential for success if it's properly integrated with the entire CGSOC course and is not a competitor with other instructors. Hiring recently retired officers for CGSOC is currently happening with the Mentor Program.[106] The five mentors hired for academic year 2000-2001 are hired through a private contracting firm, MPRI. A similar firm, or MPRI, could serve in the same role for the C^2M program.[107] Additionally, the current AOASF (Advanced Operational Arts Study Fellowship) program at Ft. Leavenworth could be expanded to provide a small group of former battalion commanders and War College graduates to become Counselors, Coaches and Mentors (C^2M) for CGSOC for at least a year following their course.

The Army must focus the resources of quality instructors to the institution in order to be successful. The Army is good in dedicating time to send officers to schools but it also needs to back it up with the most important ingredient to make it successful, instructors. Counseling, coaching and mentoring officers in the institutional schoolhouse should be a career enhancing assignment and not considered a "dead end". In an era of senior officers wanting longer assignments, and more stability in some cases for their high school aged children, stabilized instructor assignments from five to ten years would be a positive incentive for officers to stay in the Army and serve. Officers opting to stay at Fort Leavenworth would decline the opportunity for brigade level command. Again, the Army must undergo a holistic change that embeds leadership development throughout training, personnel management and education. Officers in lieu of retiring from the Army, in order to bring stability to their families, would have other options that allow them to continue to serve. Why not have a career field that focuses on

37

leadership development? The Army could train and develop specially trained officers in the leadership development field. Officers would need to have the right balance between operational assignments and educational background. The right balance under the current retirement policies would be for officer's after battalion command to move into the leadership development field this would allow about eight to nine years of continued service prior to mandatory retirement. Another option is to extend the mandatory retirement policy allowing former brigade commander's to enter the leadership development field.

The Schoolhouse Curriculum: "Know thyself, Develop Others"

Back to Figure 4, the first process of leadership development is knowledge. An area for improvement in the institutional schoolhouse is knowledge. The schoolhouse spends plenty of time instructing technical and tactical knowledge. CGSOC includes a mandatory 407 hours of tactics instruction for all officers that includes fundamental/operational warfighting and time spent at the end of the year for the Prairie Warrior command post exercise.[108] On the other hand, 30 hours are spent on a wide range of leadership classes.[109] Leadership development will become more effective if it was focused and embedded into the educational process. The focus should be on self-knowledge and how to develop others. Within the process of knowledge are four components of self-knowledge, counseling skills, values and embedded leadership. The author has determined through a research survey that these four components have the most importance for leadership development within the process of knowledge.

The leadership courses at the Captains Career Course and CGSOC need to be focused on specific areas. The leadership problems that the Army is faced with stem from failures in character and individual development of self or of others. Major General (Retired) John Faith and former commander of the 1st Armored Division states that "Self-knowledge is the key to self-improvement and the correction of the few persistent, destructive flaws in the culture of our otherwise highly effective Army."[110] Additionally, student officers in the career course do not

receive time in how to counsel their subordinates. They do receive fours hours of instruction in developing a unit counseling program and three hours in developing subordinates leaders in a company.[111] These courses in the Infantry Captains Career Course (ICCC), as mentioned before, are conducted in a large lecture hall type of instruction. The career course would be an ideal location using recent input from operational assignments to build upon self-knowledge and sustain/improve personal counseling/coaching skills. Officers do not receive instruction on how to counsel subordinates during CAS^3 or CGSOC. Lieutenant General (Retired) Walter Ulmer Jr., former III Corps Commander, states that "The complex task of giving developmental feedback to subordinates is not taught in the Army school system."[112] Counseling, coaching or mentoring skills are considered important but are considered learned as a second lieutenant or as a cadet and is taken for granted that one has those skills especially as he becomes more senior. It is important that officers not only learn more about themselves but also how to counsel, coach and mentor. The focus in the schoolhouse will be the formal and informal one-on-one contact between instructor and student. The student will learn vicariously through the role modeling of the C^2M and other instructors in how to counsel, coach and mentor. The 360-degree assessment feedback would offer the start point in individual development. Some minimal baseline group instruction on individual and values development would take place. The over twenty-one hours of "leadership" taught in the C^3 could be reduced to six hours of group time (small staff group not entire C^3 class) to cover the basics of individual and values development. The remaining hours are reinvested for a better return by having designated instructor (C^2M in CGSOC) individual leadership development time.

Values Education:

The next component for focus in the knowledge process is character and values education. Some of the complaints identified in the Army involve problems with shortcomings in leaders exhibiting and instilling the Army values. Additionally, the Army is encountering "Generations

39

X & Y" that may demonstrate values that run counter to the Army values. The Army is challenged by a large number in American society that believes in situational ethics.[113] Experienced and qualified instructors are important when dealing with student officers in role modeling Army values. Values like counseling are taken for granted and it is assumed that all officers coming into the service have developed values through family, church, coaches, and schools that are the same as the institutional values. Discussions, vignettes and seminars on all the Army values would be beneficial.

Within the knowledge process for the institutional schoolhouse the focus needs to be on self-knowledge and interpersonal skills involving counseling, coaching, mentoring subordinates and values/character development. The "primary emphasis in leadership development is on building and using interpersonal competence."[114]

Values education would take place within the leadership development embedded environment throughout the educational process. For example, in military history courses ethical issues would be discussed within the parameters of war crimes committed during a war. One of the roles of LETDD would be to integrate leadership development into the curriculum of other departments and schools. The role of CALD (LETDD) would be as a coordinating agency to integrate leadership development into all of the Army's schoolhouses. Issues not settled by the Commander, CALD and the schoolhouse commander's would be raised as issues to the Army Vice Chief of Staff for resolution.

Experience:
Learning Free Environment

The second process of leadership development in the institutional schoolhouse seen in Figure 4 that of experience. Again, the author based on a research survey developed three components within experience being a learning free environment, past experiences and leadership vignettes. The schoolhouse offers a great opportunity for the closest thing the Army can offer to a learning

free environment. An officer attending an institutional course is less worried about making mistakes in the process of learning than in an operational assignment. It would be hoped that the same environment would exist in operational assignments and there would not be a "zero mistake" climate but unfortunately that is not always the case. The schoolhouse offers an open and honest environment between the instructors and the student. The institution allows for a leadership laboratory to explore and investigate past, present and future leadership experiences.

Simulations:

Types of experience that can be conducted in the schoolhouse could consist of different types of simulations. Currently, tactical simulations are used in many of the officer courses. Simulations could also be used in leadership vignettes similar to what is being done in the units of Initial Brigade Combat Teams at Ft. Lewis, Washington. Major General James Dubik (currently, Command General 25th Infantry Division), as the Deputy Commanding General for Transformation at Ft. Lewis, saw leadership development as a critical aspect of the IBCT. For a five-day period once a quarter, General Dubik developed a program, that dealt with leadership and training vignettes focusing on interpersonal, conceptual, technical and tactical skills. The first day involved leaders from company level to brigade level. The second day focused on leaders from the battalion commander to platoon leaders. Day three included company commanders to squad leaders while day four focused on leaders from platoon level to team leaders. The fifth day was used if necessary.[115] General Dubik's attempt was to develop adaptive, cohesive working teams whom through realistic leadership and training vignettes could become more effective as a combat unit. The same type of process could be done in the institutional schoolhouse with the use of computer simulations to replicate leadership vignettes for individuals or groups. Additionally, as student officers go through tactical simulations they can also receive feedback on leadership aspects of the training exercise. The institutional schoolhouse could integrate leadership into the many hours of tactical and operational training.

41

Effective and realistic simulations that include experienced instructors providing feedback is what is necessary in the officer institutional schoolhouse. Again, the experience level of the instructors is the key to what the students receive. In addition to case studies, simulations offer hands on learning experience away from the lecturing setting of the classroom.

Feedback:

The third process in the institutional officer leadership development is feedback. The author has inserted within the feedback process three components, the 360-degree assessment, C^2M (counsel, coach, mentor) and DAP (developmental action plan). Feedback allows the student officer the information he needs to improve his individual development and how to better develop his subordinates. Again, the key to the feedback process is the experience and training of the instructors. Experienced and qualified instructors have not only the background to develop junior officers but they also have the initial creditability that greatly assists in developing officers. A major attending CGSOC with thirteen years of service will most likely listen more intently and get more out of a counselor/instructor who has been a former battalion commander versus another Major attempting to give him feedback. One of the strong points of CAS^3 is the experience level of the instructors. A drawback in the other officer schoolhouses is the problem with peer instructors developing, coaching, counseling and mentoring students. The schoolhouse offers a great environment for honest and direct feedback, something unfortunately missing in some operational units. Effective feedback to student officers in the schoolhouse should model what officers should receive and give upon their arrival to the field Army. All of us learn by observing role models. The vicarious learning in the schoolhouse has an enormous impact on leadership development. As a brand new second lieutenant attending OBC one of my most significant positive experiences was my instructor and counselor. This officer, as a captain with almost ten years in the Army was a superb role model, coach and counselor. His previous company command with the 2nd Infantry Division in Korea along with his experiences enabled him to be an

extremely effective developer. The author's personal Army experience over the last 20 years shows a trend toward officers of all ranks avoiding school instructor positions. As has been mentioned earlier, the Army needs to investigate how it can best select, train and retain officers as instructors in the schoolhouses. The officer management system needs significant changes in order to fix the Army's education system.

360 Degree Assessment:

One of the more successful tools used in the feedback process is the 360 assessment. This process that is being used quite extensively in the business community has been used on a limited basis in the Army. The feedback assesses the officer on a number of different leadership characteristics. The feedback comes from self, subordinates, peers and leaders, therefore giving a 360-degree view of the officer. As stated by General Ulmer, "Some of the critical characteristics and behaviors of the transformational leader are often undisclosed to the boss but are glaringly evident to subordinates and frequently clear to peers. What the boss measures most reliably are immediate task accomplishment, structural decisions, and adherence to prescribed strategy."[116] Recent studies from the CAL's Leadership Research and Assessment Division (LRAD) have been very positive in the use of the 360 assessment. Results from the 212th Field Artillery Brigade and the 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division show that over 86% of leaders receiving the 360 feedback had received new information about their leadership. Over 80% of the leaders involved believed the 360 was beneficial to their leader development, over 95% thought the program was valuable and over 65% of all participants reported leadership improvement since the 360 assessment.[117]

The richness of a 360 assessment is the ability to get feedback from others you interact with in your job. Who knows better than your subordinates and peers the "real" quality of your performance? The Army, like it did with its great success in creating a learning environment with the After Action Review (AAR) in the 1980's with training, can do the same thing in leadership

development with the 360 assessment. The 360 assessment would enrich the entire counseling process (improve the OER process) making it a learning experience and it would force leaders to become more adaptable and listen better to their subordinates. Once started in the officer schoolhouse, 360 could broaden out successfully to operational units. The 360 feedback reinforces the Army's leadership doctrine and makes leadership development a truly important aspect of the Army culture rather than just a bumper sticker. The 360 assessment faces obstacles, as some leaders would be uncomfortable with this type of feedback in a military organization. Some leaders would fear that successful leadership in the Army would become a popularity contest. How a 360-assessment feedback is communicated to the Army will be its key to success. The institutional schoolhouse can instill the 360 feedback among the instructors and students to make it a successful program that links to the operational units.

The 360-assessment feedback initially would have some start-up challenges but would become a value-added improvement to the Army. Student officers, prior to their arrival to the schoolhouse, would log on a web-based program and conduct a self-assessment. Additionally, the student would select three subordinates, three peers and three senior leaders who would provide secure feedback on the Internet. The feedback assessment would be computed and provided to the SGI at the career course, staff leader at CAS^3 and the C^2M at CGSOC. The instructor would use this feedback as ground zero in working with the student officer in developing a developmental action plan (DAP) for self improvement not only for use at the educational training but also to take and use at his next operational assignment. The CAS^3 instructor would be that much further along when the student officer arrives at the course with a DAP developed and worked on at the Captains Career Course. In CGSOC, the C^2M's mission in life would be to use this feedback in order to help develop each CGSOC officer. Similar to the C^3, CGSOC could take the current 30 hours of leadership instruction and keep 6-8 hours for small staff group instruction on individual and values development and use the remaining 24 hours on individual

one-on-one leadership development time with the C^2M. The intent is not to add more instruction but be smarter in arranging the time. Follow-up by the instructor with the student officer after the student left the schoolhouse for an operational unit would reinforce the schoolhouse development. Techniques that could be effective would be the use of teleconferencing, e-mail or personal visits.

Time:

As we continue to examine the officer institutional leadership development, the final process in Figure 4 is time. We put our time toward what we believe is important. The institutional schoolhouse needs to use its time more effectively in leadership development. Restructuring leadership development does not mean adding leadership courses. It means eliminating some of the current courses. The author as a recipient and instructor of CGSOC leadership courses identifies a worthwhile use of eliminating broad lessons such as envisioning, command philosophy and multicultural/generational awareness as a start point in focusing on individual development. Leadership courses as has been reviewed cover a wide range of issues/concerns without a focused approach on the individual leader.

It also means embedding leadership throughout the course of instruction. The SGI in the Captains Career Course and the staff group leaders in CAS^3 instruct all courses for the student officer. Therefore, these instructors are the cornerstone for leadership development within the student officer. A technique to assist these instructors in the career course or CAS^3 may mean developing a team teaching of two to four officers to allow some of the burden sharing and not overtax one instructor.

In CGSOC, the C^2M would be the leadership integrator and developer for two staff groups. This officer would be specially trained and focused on developing the CGSOC officer. This officer will be trained and qualified to provide 360 assessment feedback, developmental counseling skills, values/character development and provide the special requirements involving international officers and officers from other United States military services. Even though the

45

CGSOC leadership program would be oriented on United States Army leadership doctrine, modified versions would be applicable to international and other United States military service officers.

Improvements in individual leadership development, character development and changes within the organizational structure/manning within the officer institutional schoolhouse and the Army will improve morale. By focusing these changes at the Captains Career Course, CAS^3 and CGSOC, an enormous, positive impact can be made on the officers attending these courses. Improved morale will increase retention and effectiveness.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

The United States Army is currently unmatched in the world as a fighting force. It won the fifty-year cold war. It successfully completed operations in Panama and Iraq with incredible efficiency and speed. Despite the great successes that the Army has had over recent years it is also experiencing some significant problems with its officers as reflected by a record number of Captains leaving the service and significant complaints from CGSOC students and others. The biggest reasons for the complaints are increased operational pace, reduced resources and a disappointment in the Army's leadership at all levels. Officers do not believe they are valued and the leadership has shown this by not investing the time in developing the junior officers. The Army, as an institution, believes it is the model for developing leadership. Unfortunately, it is not.

The United States Army, in order to improve its' poor morale, must improve its' officer leadership development in the institutional schoolhouse. The first step is improvement in the organizational structure from the Department of the Army staff to the schoolhouses. Added emphasis and integration for leadership development should occur throughout the Army. The Army must embed leadership development as a holistic process throughout training, personnel management, efficiency reports and education system. The areas of concern addressed in this paper are a point of departure and not the final solution. Additional research must be conducted to bring about solutions in military education organizational structure, curriculum and instructors.

The second step is to adjust the curriculum on leadership that is currently being taught in the schoolhouse. Leadership development must be focused on the individual and not large classroom instruction. Leadership development should be embedded within the educational program of instruction. An integrated embedded leadership development program that stresses individual development should replace the current leadership courses.

47

The third step is the improvement of the instructors in the schoolhouse. The Army institutional schoolhouse should not be a career dead end. The schoolhouse should be where we put our best and brightest. Additionally, all instructors should bring aspects of leadership into their classrooms. The 360-assessment feedback is currently the best tool available to help the student officers be all they can be. We must train, develop and assign officers who are experts in the practical and theoretical aspects of leadership development.

None of this can be successful without the full and active backing of the Army's senior leadership. Senior leaders must be the first to role model 360 assessment feedback for it to be successful. They must talk and preach the type of leadership that is found in FM 22-100. According to General Jack Keane, Vice Chief of Staff, operational tempo was a factor in officers leaving the service, but the key was leadership. According to Keane, the quality of leadership as reflected by mentoring had fallen off in recent years. "We're just not taking the time that we need to spend with our youngsters and their personal growth and development".[118]

The United States Army is a great institution it can do much to improve, especially in leadership development in the officer institutional schoolhouse. The most important thing an institution can do is effectively develop the leadership skills of its' leaders. Making changes in the institutional schoolhouse will improve morale therefore increasing retention and effectiveness throughout the Army.

Figure 5

United States Army Leadership Development Organization

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  Army Staff  ◄─────────────    Army Vice Chief of Staff                    PERSCOM
                                         │                                   (OPMS)
                                         │
      Army Research Institute            │                                   TRADOC
                                         │                                   FORSCOM
                                         ▼                                    MACOMS
                          ┌──────────────────────────────┐
      Combat             (                                )            USMA
      Training (CTCs) ◄──(    Center for Army             )            Dept. of Behavioral
      Centers            (    Leadership Development       )            Science & Leadership
                         (    (CALD)                       )             (BS & L)
                         (    Fort Leavenworth             )
                          └──────────────────────────────┘

                                    LRAD
                                    LETDD
                                    LDO
                                    CLTD
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NCO Schoolhouses

PLDC
BNCOC
ANCOC
1SG Course
SMA

Warrant Officer Schoolhouses

Warrant Course
Basic Warrant Course
Advanced Course

◄═══════

Officer Schoolhouses

Pre-Commissioning
• USMA
• ROTC
• OCS

Officer Basic Course

Captains Career Course

CAS^3

CGSOC

Army War College

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┌───┐
│   ***LRAD***   │
│   • **Leadership Research**   │
│   • **360 Assessment Feedback**   │
│   │
│   ***LETDD***   │
│   • **Curriculum Development for all**   │
│   **Army Leadership Courses**   │
│   │
│   ***LDO***   │
│   • **Doctrine (FM 22-100)**   │
│   • **Integrate Leadership**   │
│   **Development throughout the**   │
│   **Army (Mgt,Tng,OERs,NCOERs)**   │
│   • **Counselors, Coaches & Mentors**   │
│   **(C^2M)**   │
│   │
│   **CLTD**   │
│   • **Army Civilian Leadership &**   │
│   **Training**   │
└───┘

ENDNOTES

[1] Comments from the CGSOC Majors were made in March 2000 in their staff groups prior to the visit of the Army Chief of Staff, General Eric Shinseki. The comments were e-mailed throughout the Army. The two e-mail copies I received at different times have the same information. Due to the Army's sensitivity to the information it was not publicly released.

[2] United States General Accounting Office, *Briefing Report to Congressional Requesters, Military Personnel: Perspectives of Surveyed Service Members in Retention Critical Specialties*, GAO/NSIAD-99-197BR (Washington, D.C.: United States General Accounting Office, August 1999), 16. Percent of Surveyed Service Members in Retention Critical Specialties Who are Satisfied and Dissatisfied with the military, Dissatisfied: Officers, Army 43%, Navy 65%, Air Force 36%, USMC 39%. Percent of Surveyed Service Members in Retention Critical Specialties Who Intend to Stay or Leave the Military, Leaving: Officers, Army 53%, Navy 33%, Air Force 31%, USMC 44%. Page 14.

[3] United States Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, *Survey on Officers Careers-1998, Update: Effects of the Drawdown on Officers' Attitudes and Career Intentions*, Report No. 1999-01 (Alexandria, Va.: Army Research Institute, May 1999), 6.

[4] Department of the Army, *The Army Vision: Soldiers on Point for the Nation*, (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, October 1999).

[5] FM 22-100: Leadership, was published by the Army in the summer of 1999. The author was a battalion commander at Ft. Wainwright, Alaska during the release of FM 22-100. The author did not see a copy of the Army's premier leadership manual until his arrival at Fort Leavenworth, July 2000. At least in Alaska, the manual was not in evidence.

[6] United States Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, *Survey on Officers Careers-2000, Perceptions of Army Leadership*, Report No. 2000-12 (Alexandria, Va.: Army Research Institute, September 2000), 1. Figure 1: "How satisfied are you with the quality of supervision you receive in your current assignment?" Company Grade Officers: 1998-64%, 2000-59%, Field Grade Officers: 1998-68%, 2000-64%.

[7] Ibid., 2. Figure 2: "To what extent have the superiors in your chain of command put the Army values taught in leadership courses into practice?" Company Grade Officers: 1998-48%, 2000-39%, Field Grade Officer: 1998-53%, 2000-44%.

[8] Department of the Army, Pamphlet 350-58, *Leader Development for America's Army*, (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, October 1994), Figure 1.

[9] Myron Griswold, Colonel, CGSC, Director of Academic Operations, interview by author, Ft. Leavenworth, KS., 23 January 2001. All officers attend the captains career course and CAS^3 with currently about 50% of a year group attending resident CGSOC as the Army moves toward Intermediate Level Education (ILE) or universal resident education for all majors. As of this date, a contracting group led by Colonel (Retired) John Lewis is developing a proposal for "Universal Military Education Level 4" or ILE (Intermediate Education Level).

[10] GAO, Briefing Report to Congressional Requesters, Military Personnel: Perspectives of Surveyed Service Members in Retention Critical Specialties, 1.

[11] United States Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, *Survey on Officers Careers-2000, Career Intent Among Company Grade Officers*, Report No. 2000-09 (Alexandria, Va.: Army Research Institute, December 21, 2000), Table 2, page 5. Data base of 8,957 company grade officers, Most Frequently Selected Reasons for Leaving the Army before Retirement. Officers leaving and undecided: Away from my family too much: 20.7%, Quality of military leadership: 16.8%.

[12] ARI, Report No. 2000-12, Table 1, page 2, Rater's Skills % Reporting "Good" or "Very Good" Technical Competence (Branch/Functional Area) was rated the best, Company Grade Officers-76%, Field Grade Officers-81%,
The worst was Conducting Quarterly Counseling: Company Grade Officers-33%, Field Grade Officers-25%; Offering constructive criticism to improve performance: Company Grade Officers-52%, Field Grade Officers-55%.

[13] William Bennett, "Book of Virtues," (1993) : 14, quoted in Maureen LeBoeuf, *"Developing a Leadership Philosophy" Military Review* LXXXIX (May-June 1999), 30. Character is the foundation of leadership. Improving character development will improve leadership development, "values… as the central theme of human nature, not as something to have but as something to be, the most important thing to be".

[14] The author as a captain in the 7th Infantry Division (Light) at an infantry battalion rotation at the National Training Center (NTC), Ft. Irwin, CA., in February 1986 to a battalion commander, 2nd Battalion, 1st Infantry Regiment, at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), Ft. Polk, LA., January 2000, saw the dramatic evolution of the After Action Review (AAR) in United States Army training from a one sided critique of training to a shared professional military dialogue on doctrine, tactics, techniques and procedures.

[15] The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), *American Military Culture in the Twenty-First Century*, (Washington, D.C.: The CSIS Press, February 2000), xxi.

[16] Department of the Army, *Field Manual 3-0, Operations-DRAG Edition* (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 15 June 2000) 4-6.

[17] CSIS, 38.

[18] Michael Matthews & John Hyatt, *Factors Affecting the Career Decisions of Army Captains: Research Report 1760* (Alexandria, Va.: Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, June 2000), 12. ARI's study surveyed a total of 47 Captains (17 leaving the Army, 15 staying in the Army, and 15 who had recently returned to the Army). Out of the 15 "returners" surveyed only three had received meaningful mentoring in their early years as lieutenants. One "returners" response about a former company commander, "One was horrible-he told me he only cared about getting promoted and he could care less about soldiers."

[19] United States Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, *Survey on Officers Career-2000: Career Intent Among Company Grade Officers*, Report No. 2000-09 (Alexandria, Va.: Army Research Institute, December 2000) Table 2.

[20] CGSOC staff group notes, March 2000.

[21] Michael Matthews & John Hyatt, *Factors Affecting the Career Decisions of Army Captains: Research Report 1760* (Alexandria, Va.: Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, June 2000), 18.

[22] Thomas Ricks, "Army is alarmed by rising departure of Captains", *The Indianapolis Star*, 23 November 2000, F14.

[23] Michael Matthews & John Hyatt, 16. Additionally, comments from CGSOC students, March 2000, prior to the Army Chief of Staff's visit in reference to Captain's attrition about "Treating soldiers like pieces of meat instead of valued individuals is the primary reason for bad retention."

[24] United States Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, *Survey Report, Officer Careers, Plans, and Emerging Issues: Focus Group Research 1998-1999*, Report No. 2000-04 (Alexandria, Va.: Army Research Institute, November 1999), 2.

[25] ARI, Report No. 2000-09, 6.

[26] Myron Griswold, interview.

[27] CGSOC staff groups notes, March 2000. Complaints about "Bosses" being too busy; no face to face. Most important thing is to be leader yet the first thing that falls out when time is tight is mentoring; counseling is not happening.

[28] CGSOC staff groups notes, March 2000. "I've been in the Army 14 years, and I've been counseled in writing twice—and once was my ACE (Academic Counselor & Evaluator) here."

[29] CGSOC staff groups notes, March 2000. "The Army's senior leadership has a definite credibility problem. There is a lack of trust."

[30] CGSOC staff groups notes, March 2000. "We have a checklist type of leadership….not true leadership…senior leader are simply checking the block."

[31] CGSOC staff groups notes, March 2000. "It is believed that most officers do not practice proper counseling of subordinate leaders, nor do they know how. It is believed that the Army does not do enough to teach how to counsel, nor does it enforce standing requirements to counsel leaders. In a similar vein, the new OER is considered a "band-aide" which will not address the tendency to not counsel and not develop leaders, and not to tell the truth on OERs for fear of hurting the officer."

[32] CGSOC staff groups notes, March 2000.

[33] CGSOC staff groups notes, March 2000. Specific reasons cited by a staff group as to why they stayed in: Not in any order of priority:

    a.   Job Satisfaction
    b.   Integrity and professionalism of fellow soldiers
    c.   (Lack) of (similar) civilian job opportunities
    d.   Leadership and mentorship experienced

[34] United States Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, Officers Careers, Plans, and Emerging Issues: *Focus Group Research 1998-1999: Leader Development: The Officer Perspective*, No. 2000-06 (Alexandria, Va.: Army Research Institute, November 1999)1,

[35] Thomas Ricks, F14.

[36] John Hillen, "Must US Military Culture Reform? *Parameters* XXIX (Autumn 1999): 18.

[37] John Hillen, 19.

[38] Jean Gaslin, Major, Executive Officer and Project Officer, Leadership Education & Training Development Division (LETDD-CAL), Interview by author, Ft. Leavenworth, KS., 24 January 2001. 2 hours in the Captains Career Course is focused on ethical education. Department of the Army, C700: Fundamental of Excellence: Character and Competence Advance Book, (Ft. Leavenworth, KS., August 2000) , 2 hours in CGSOC is focused on ethical conduct and 4 hours on consideration for others, respect, discrimination and multicultural/generational awareness.

[39] Herbert Barber, Professor, Director of Individual Assessment and Development Program, Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA., phone interview by author, 23 January 2001.

[40] David Giber, Louis Carter & Marshall Goldsmith, Editors, *Linkage Inc.'s Best Practices in Leadership Development Handbook: Case Studies, Instruments, Training,* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass/Pfeiffer and Linkage Inc., 2000), xiv. The activities that have the most impact for leadership development programs from eight major manufacturing and pharmaceutical firms. Not in order of importance.
1. Action learning 2. Cross functional/rotational training 3. 360 degree feedback 4. Exposure to senior executives 5. External coaching 6. Formal mentoring 7. Informal mentoring

[41] Walter Golden, Lieutenant Colonel, Division Chief: Leadership, DCSPER, Washington, D.C., e-mail to author, 26 October 2000.

[42] Walter Golden, e-mail.

[43] Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, DCSPER, Directorate of Human Resources, Leadership Division; available from http://www.odcsper.army.mil/default.asp?pageid=10f accessed from ODCSPER personnel organization chart to Directorate of Human Resources to Leadership Division; Internet; accessed on 26 January 2001.

[44] Slides presented by LTG Timothy J. Maude, Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, at Commander's Conference, 19 October 2000, solutions to Captains attrition:
1.   Activate company grade web site.
2.   Measure/track PERSTEMPO on ORB.
3.   Poll YG 96-97 on alternatives.
4.   Expand post CCC assignment options.
5.   Post short tour guarantee
6.   Increase educational opportunities
7.   Graduate education sooner.

[45] Deputy Chief of Staff for Training, TRADOC, available from http:www.dcst.monroe.army.mil/itd/leader/leader.htm; Internet; accessed on 26 January 2001.

[46] Center for Army Leadership, Command & General Staff College, available from http://www-cgsc.army.mil/cal/index.htm; Internet; accessed on 26 January 2001.

[47] Command & General Staff College, available from http://www-cgsc.army.mil/; Internet; accessed on 26 January 2001.

[48] Ibid.

[49] Ibid.

[50] Clark Delaven, Lieutenant Colonel, Chief: Leadership Development Office (LDO), Center for Army Leadership (CAL), Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas, e-mail to author, 6 March 2001. LDO is authorized 13 officer, warrant officer and NCO positions. As of 6 March 2001, LDO had five assigned.

[51] CAL, Internet, 26 January 2001.

1. Civilian Leadership & Training Division (CLTD)
2. Leadership Research & Assessment Division (LRAD)
3. Leadership Development Office (LDO)
4. Leadership Instruction Division (LID)
5. Leadership Education & Training Development Division (LETDD)
6. Military Law Office (MLO)

[52] Richard Fagan, Lieutenant Colonel, Chief, Leadership Research & Assessment Division (LRAD), CAL, e-mail to author, 5 March 2001. LRAD is authorized LTC (49-ORSA) x 2, Major (49-ORSA) x 1, E7 x 1, currently on-hand LTC (EN) x 1, Major (49-ORSA) x 1, GS 12 x 1, E7 x 1. As of 5 March 2001, the Major and the E7 were tasked to the ATLDP (Army Training & Leadership Development Panel), The "Blue Ribbon" panel.

[53] Center for Army Leadership, Leadership Research & Assessment Division (LRAD), available from http://www.cgsc.army.mil/cal/LRAD/index.htm; Internet; accessed on 26 January 2001.

[54] Richard Fagan, e-mail to author, 26 December 2000. "No money left to fund any more pilots (360 Assessment) – future remains in question – a great program with a lot of potential ... but an unfunded program ... and many senior leaders no not believe that the Army is really ready for 360."

[55] Ibid.

[56] Center for Army Leadership, Leadership Development Office available from http://www.cgsc.army.mil/cal/LDO/ldo/default.htm; Internet; accessed on 26 January 2001.

[57] Personal knowledge of author, LTC Jon Smidt and Don Criag were detailed from LID during the summer of 1998 to assist in writing FM 22-100 with a contractor.

[58] Center for Army Leadership, Leadership Education & Training Development Division (LETDD) available from http://www.cgsc.army.mil/cal/LETDD/CALLETDD.htm; Internet; accessed on 26 January 2001.

[59] Jean Gaslin, Lieutenant Colonel, Chief, Leadership Education & Training Development Division (LETDD), CAL, e-mail to author, 6 March 2001. Authorized LTC x 2, Majors x 3, Captains x 2, NCO's x 2, Department of the Army Civilians (DAC) x 3. On-hand LTC x 3, NCO's x 2 (both working on ATLDP) and one DAC. "Several of these authorizations are deleted on the next TDA (Oct 01)."

[60] Department of the Army, *OPMS XXI: Final Report* (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, (9 July 1997), iv.

[61] TRADOC Common Core for Officers, as of 31 August 2000, given to author by Major Jean Gaslin, Executive Officer and Project Officer, Leadership Education & Training Development Division (LETDD), Center for Army Leadership (CAL).

[62] Wesley Odum, Major, Team Chief, Small Group Instructors, USAIS, Ft. Benning, GA, e-mail to author, 26 January 2001.

[63] Gordon Roberts, Major, Leadership Branch Chief, USAIS, Ft. Benning, GA, e-mail to author, 25 January 2001.

[64] Wesley Odum, 26 January 2001.

[65] Gordon Roberts, 25 January 2001. "Major feedback is that discussion on real-life experience and historical examples helps what are otherwise looked at as a fairly boring classes. Our take on that is that ICCC students have heard it all before and need a large number of motivators to stress the importance of leadership as a subject." A good example of leadership development in the schoolhouse?

[66] Wesley Odum, 26 January 2001.

[67] Joseph McLamb, Major, Assistant Operations Officer, USAAS, Ft. Knox, KY, e-mail to author, 6 March 2001. And the Armor Captains Career Course available from http://www.11147.238.160.21lac3/Outlaw/Administration/Warrior_trail.htm; Internet; accessed on 5 March 2001.

[68] Department of the Army, *Review of Education and Training for Officers (RETO) Volume 1. An Overview,* (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 30 June 1978), VI-5.

[69] Combined Arms and Services Staff School: CAS³): available from http://www-cgsc.army.mil/cas3/cas3info.htm; Internet; accessed 19 January 2001.

[70] Paul Bethea, Lieutenant Colonel, CAS³ Instructor 1997-2001, interview with author, 6 January 2001

[71] Ibid.

[72] Ibid. Additionally, CAS³ Lesson 11:F440-11; Leadership Advance Sheet and Staff Leader Notes.

[73] Myron Griswold, 23 January 2001. The Army is currently moving toward 100% resident attendance of middle grade officers at some type of institutional education experience. This process, called Intermediate Level Education (ILE), is based on the recommendation of the Officer Professional Military Study XXI released in 1997. Full implementation of universal military education Level 4 or ILE could mean the end for CAS^3. The primary purpose of CAS^3 was to allow all officers to attend a resident staff officer course. ILE would satisfy that requirement but later in an officer's career. The specifics on how ILE will work are still to be resolved.

[74] Jeff Irvine, Lieutenant Colonel, Academic Counselor & Advisor (ACE) and Leadership instructor, CGSC, e-mail to author, 19 January 2001.

[75] Traci Stanley, Major, CGSC, Officer in Charge of CGSC Mentor Program, Directorate of Academic Operations (DAO), phone interview by author, Ft. Leavenworth, KS., 24 January 2001. An experimental Mentor's Program was initiated at CGSOC during school year 2000-2001. Five recently retired Colonels and Lieutenant Colonels were hired through a commercial contractor to assist the faculty in counseling, coaching, mentoring and offering additional operational experience to the CGSC classroom. Each mentor has responsibility to mentor or provide guidance for four staff groups of about sixty-four student officers. The mentors where required to counsel each student during the fall term but it was optional for the spring term. According to the officer in charge, the program has had mixed reviews half way through the year.

[76] Jeff Irvine, 19 January 2001.

[77] School for Command Preparation (SCP), CGSC, available from http://www.cgsc.army.mil/scp/courses/courses.htm; Internet; accessed on 26 January 2001.

[78] Department of the Army, *C700: Fundamental of Excellence: Character and Competence Advance Book*, (Ft. Leavenworth, KS., August 2000) , i.

C700 Leadership Lessons

Lsn 1: Course Overview, critical reasoning & creative thinking, leadership doctrine (4 hrs)

Lsn 2: Discussion with the Deputy Commandant on organizational leadership (2 hrs)

Lsn 3: Army values and command philosophy (3 hrs)

Lsn 4: Culture, climate, ethical climate, command philosophy (4 hrs)

Lsn 5: Ethical standards (2 hrs)

Lsn 6: Consideration of others, discrimination, multicultural/generational awareness (4 hrs)

Lsn 7: Leader panel, team building, cohesion, envisioning (5 hrs)

Lsn 8: Individual leadership development, developing subordinates, counseling (3 hrs)

Lsn 9: Organizational leader development programs (3 hrs)

Total: 30 hours

[79] Eliot A. Cohen, "Defending America in the 21st Twenty-first Century", *Foreign Affairs* 79 (Nov/Dec 2000) 54.

[80] Griswold, 23 January 2001.

[81] Barry Leslie, Lieutenant Colonel, G1, CGSC, e-mail to author, 30 January 2001.

Current TDA 0301 (Version 3, FY 2001)

Military Instructors: CGSOC Required: 183, Authorized: 159, On-Hand: 114

Military Instructors: CAS3, Required: 85, Authorized: 76, On-Hand: 44

158 Military Instructors: 1 x Ph.D. (Doctor of Veterinary Medicine) 113 x Masters Degree,

44 x Bachelors Degree only. Majors x 44, Lieutenant Colonels x 114.

[82] Victor Wu, Major, Executive Officer, Leadership Instruction Division (LID), e-mail to author, 5 January 2001.

[83] Griswold, 23 January 2001.

[84] Department of Army Regulation 600-100: *Army Leadership*, 17 Sept. 1993., Department of Army Regulation 600-3: *Commissioned Officer Development & Career Management*, 1 October 1998., Field Manual 22-100, *Army Leadership*, June 1999., Department of the Army Pamphlet 350-58, *Leader Development for America's Army*, 13 October 1994.

[85] Edgar F. Puryear Jr., *American Generalship*, (Novato, CA.: Presidio Press, 2000), xv. "The greatest of all is character, which is everything in leadership. It permeates throughout all the qualities essential for leadership success."

[86] Center for Army Leadership, *Organizational Leadership For Executives (OLE)* (Ft. Leavenworth, KS.: Center for Army Leadership, April 2000), 171. "In On Becoming a Leader, Warren Bennis writes, "Until

54

you truly know yourself, strengths and weaknesses, know what you want to do and why you want to do it, you cannot succeed in any but the most superficial sense of the word."

[87] John Faith, Major General, United States Army Retired, "Leadership in the 21st Century: Is It Time to change the system?, *Army* 50 (December 2000) 12-13. "Unquestionably intelligent, dedicated, effective and productive officers, (senior officers) they are also nevertheless flawed, as we all are. They have been recognized and promoted over the years because of their success in producing, for the most part, short-term, measurable results. They are characterized by a strong sense of mission and can-do attitudes, but too many of them tend to be less effective in self-knowledge, flexibility and willingness to learn."

[88] Don Craig, Lieutenant Colonel, United States Army, "Designing a Battalion Leadership Development Program", *Military Review* LXXXIX (May/June 1999) 7-17.

[89] Joseph LeBoeuf, Colonel, Professor, Department of Behavioral Science & Leadership (BS & L), United States Military Academy, interview by author, Ft. Leavenworth, KS., 7 November 2000. And LTC Craig article in "Designing a Battalion Leadership Development Program", "The Army's LDF (Leadership Development Framework) defines the broad goal for operational assignments-to master leader values, skills, attributes and actions. Unfortunately, there is no Army doctrine that describes a formal process to achieve this goal."

[90] LeBoeuf, 7 November 2000.

[91] Cynthia McCauley, Russ Moxley & Ellen Van Velson, Editors, *The Center for Creative Leadership Handbook of Leader Development*, 3.

[92] Command & General Staff College, CGSC, available from http://www.cgsc.army.mil/; Internet; accessed on 13 February 2001.

CGSOC Core Curriculum

C300 Fundamental of Warfighting, 165 hours

C400 Resource Planning & Force Management, 38 hours

C500 Fundamental of Operational Warfighting, 130 hours

C600 Evolution of Modern Warfare, 54 hours

C700 Leadership, 64 hours, includes 30 hrs. leadership lessons, 17 hours training management, 14 hours military law and 3 hours public affairs lessons.

C950 Prairie Warrior, 112 hours

[93] Walter F. Ulmer Jr., "Military Leadership into the 21st Century: Another "Bridge Too Far?" *Parameters*, Spring 1998 [journal on-line]; available from http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/parameters/98spring/ulmer.hm; Internet; accessed 29 August 2000, p. 6 of 19. "The complex task of giving developmental feedback to subordinates is not taught in the Army school system. The Army War College has included some behavioral feedback in its program in recent years, but it is unlikely that there is the essential follow-up in the students' next organization to exploit the process." Additionally, surveying the hours devoted in CGSOC in note #92 only 30 hours of leadership instruction are within the total common core hours of 563 total instruction hours.

[94] Department of the Army, Soldier Training Publication, STP21-III-MQS, *Military Qualifciation Standards III, Leader Development for Majors and Lieutenant Colonels.* (Washington, D.C., 30 June 1993) v. "In the officer education system (OES) MQS is the primary implementation vehicle of the self-development training strategy of the Army's Combined Arms Training Strategy (CATS). The MQS system provides a blueprint for officer training and leader development in both resident schools and units. It is designed to integrate the efforts of school commandants, unit commanders, and individual officers as the officers pursue their professional development and acquire the skills they require to go to war." Great ideas for leadership development but based on the author's own personal Army experiences during this time and a research review nothing ever came of the MQS system. It was a good idea with good potential that went no where in the Army. The program did not receive the support from the Army's leadership or from the leaders in the field.

[95] James Dubik, Major General, United States Army, "IBCT at Fort Lewis*" Military Review*, LXXX (September/October 2000), 23. "Experiences come from three significant places—personal experience and the experience of peers and seniors....That training (leadership training) will go on every quarter for three to six days with four to six repetitive vignettes per day, further increasing everyone's experience base. By nesting leadership that way, leaders will gain experience and learn how to solve problems. They will learn from peers, superiors and subordinates."

[96] Herbert Barber, phone interview by author, 23 January 2001.

[97] CAL, CGSC, available from http://ww-cgsc.army.mil/cal/index.htm; Internet; accessed on 26 January 2001.

[98] Leadership development organizational structure has significant challenges to overcome in becoming the holistic program the author advocates. This paper only scratches the surface of critical issues of leadership development's integration with organizational structure/chain of command, training, education, officer efficiency reports and personnel management.
Leadership Development Organizational structure/chain of command. CALD to be successful will have to have the authority to impact leadership development on institutions like the USMA and the Army War College. These two organizations fall under different organizational structures (CSA and DCSOPS). The influence of the VCSA and the Commander, CALD will be essential for success.
Training. Another decisive point for success must be the integration leadership development with training, especially, at the Combat Training Centers (CTC). The CTC's are standard bearers for the Army. Successful leadership development programs role-modeled at the CTC's will travel back to the schoolhouse and field units. Training needs to have a leadership battlefield operating system (BOS). The Army AAR's covers tactical components of training there also needs to be a leadership component.
Education. The Army takes great pride in sending officers to school. Time in school does not equal a successful educational process. The author has already mentioned about the split in roles and responsibility between TRADOC, USMA and the AWC. The Army lacks integration in officer education with different officer educational institutions marching to different drummers. Additionally, it is career enhancing to be an instructor at USMA and but not CGSOC or CAS^3. Instructor shortages are critical at CGSOC but not at the USMA.
Additionally, the integration of leadership development into the Army schoolhouses is an area that in a perfect world will be successful by CALD's coordination. If the Commander, CALD and the schoolhouse commander cannot resolve the issue then it is brought forward to the VCSA for resolution with the appropriate schoolhouse. This paper does not resolve this problem but provides a starting point for further research into this area.
Officer Efficiency Reports (OERs). OERs are performance evaluations that are used to determine officers who are selected for promotion, schools and commands. OERs have the potential to become a better leadership development tool. OERs as advocated by LTG (Retired) Walt Ulmer should include feedback on officers not only from seniors but also from peers and subordinates.
Officer Personnel Management System (OPMS). The Army with the advent of OPMS XXI has developed Career Field Designations (CFD) that allow officers beginning at the rank of major to become specialists in many different areas. There is probably no greater need in the Army than to develop some officers as professional educators. The USMA over the years has been very successful in developing a high quality faculty of permanent professors who serve long tours of duty at West Point. The same idea could be very successful throughout the Army's education system. Officers who would know they could stay at certain locations for an extended period, for example 8-10 years, would for many different reasons elect the opportunity. The Army would most likely keep many quality officers for a longer period given the opportunity for stability.

[99] The use of recently retired officers to serve as ROTC instructors, CAS^3 instructors and CGSOC mentors has already happened. One of the disadvantages in using a retired officer is there ability to quit their positions much easier than an active duty officer. The active duty officer is still a member of the military whereas a retired Army officer contracted to the military is still technically a civilian.

[100] Office of the Adjutant General, United States Military Academy, West Point, NY., available from http://www.usma.army.mil/AdjutantGeneral/TOEP.htm; accessed on 16 February 2001.
"A Tactical Officer (TAC) is the legal Commander of a Cadet Company and primary developer of leaders for a company of cadets at the United States Military Academy (USMA), West Point, New York. He or she assists each cadet in balancing and integrating the requirements of the physical, military, academic, and moral-ethical programs. He or she inspires cadets to develop effective leadership styles through role-modeling, counseling, teaching, and training."

[101] Office of the Adjutant General, USMA, West Point, NY., accessed on 16 February 2001. "The second phase of the Tactical Officer Education Program (TOEP) is a comprehensive one-year graduate-level

educational experience with Long Island University (LIU) and culminates in the award of a Master of Science degree in Counseling and Leader Development. Two critical dimensions of the TACs role are:

1.   To develop individual cadets to be leaders of character.
2.   To create an environment in the cadet company that fosters in individual development.

[102] Command & Staff, Special & Personal Staffs, *Army: 1999-2000, Green Book* (October 1999) 222.

[103] John Gifford, "Teaching and Learning the Operational Art of War: An Appraisal of the School of Advanced Military Studies." Monograph, U.S. Army Command & Staff College, 2000. Major Gifford in his monograph on page 9 makes the statement reference seminar leaders in the Advanced Military Study Program (AMSP) at the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS). Major Gifford statement would also apply to instructors throughout the officer education system, "The seminar leaders are the "center of gravity" of the AMSP program. They facilitate the daily learning of the majors, act as role models, and tie the theoretical subject matter to relevant topics from their military experience. The quality of the AMSP program absolutely hinges on the quality of the seminar leaders." Major Gifford references his statement with supporting evidence from the SAMS Directors Vision statement and an interview with the Director, Colonel Robin Swan on 17 April 2000.

[104] Ibid.,

[105] Bethea, 6 January 2001. CAS^3 unlike CCC or CGSOC has a significant experience level differences between the instructor and the student. Normally a LTC instructing a junior captain.

[106] A problem with hiring retired Army officers is that they are technically civilian contractors. These retired officers may quit their positions at any time. The best option would be to have trained and qualified C^2M's who are active duty officers. The Army would have to change its officer management and career system to improve this problem. Hiring retired officer for the military schoolhouse is an option that needs to be researched in more detail. It should not be used as a band-aid to solve the symptom of active duty officers leaving the service.

[107] Traci Stanley, Major, CGSC, Officer in Charge of CGSC Mentor Program, phone interview by author, Ft. Leavenworth, KS., 24 January 2001.

[108] CGSC, Internet; 13 February 2001.

[109] C700, i.

[110] Faith, 14.

[111] Jean Gaslin, Interview.

[112] Ulmer., 6.

[113] Kenneth R. Tarcza, Major, US Army, "Resolving an Army Values 'Dilemma'" unpublished, 3. Major Tarcza quotes 1997 and 1998 surveys by the Barna Research Group "Determined that most Americans do not believe either that there are absolute standards that define right and wrong behavior or that there are moral truths which are unchanging and not relative to the circumstances. Specially, their findings indicate that only 25 percent of adult Americans believe that there are absolute standards that define right and wrong behavior, while only 35 percent of adult Americans believe that there are moral truths which are unchanging and not relative to the circumstances."

[114] David V. Day, Department of Psychology, Pennsylvania State University, "Leadership Development: A Review in Context" 26 August 2000, 9.

[115] James Dubik, MG, USA, "IBCT at Fort Lewis" *Military Review*, (September/October 2000), 23.

[116] Ulmer., 9.

[117] Center for Army Leadership, Leadership Research & Assessment Division (LRAD), available from http://www.cgsc.army.mil/cal/LRAD/index.htm; Internet; accessed on 26 January 2001.

[118] Sean Naylor, "Keane blames leadership for junior officer exodus." *Army Times* (25 December 2000) 10.

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